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Abstract
The dissertation examines foreign ownership in Korea during 1998-2003. 
The capital market opening in Korea following the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis provides a unique opportunity to investigate the changes in corporate 
ownership structure. The abolition of investment ceilings and various 
restrictions for the foreign investment allow us to document the greater 
influences of foreign institutional ownership in the Korean stock market. I 
empirically investigate (1) the role of foreign ownership in dividend policy, 
(2) the link between foreign investors and labour cost, and (3) the 
relationship between the foreign ownership and the level of corporate 
donations. Using a large firm level dataset, the panel data techniques are 
used to examine the effects of foreign equity ownership. The analysis 
shows that foreign ownership is significantly related to higher dividends, 
labour costs, and corporate donations. These findings highlight the role of 
foreign ownership in influencing management practices.
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Preface
The goal of this thesis is to investigate the role of foreign ownership in 
Korea after the market liberalization that followed the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis. The thesis consists of three separate but connected essays. The first 
essay investigates the relatively unexplored relationship between 
dividends and ownership structure in an emerging market setting. The 
second essay examines the impact of foreign ownership on labour cost. 
The third essay is a contribution to the current debate on the impact of 
ownership on corporate philanthropy.
An earlier version of the first essay was published in the Proceedings of 
the 2006 Academy of Management Annual Meeting. Earlier versions of the 
other two essays were presented at the 26th and 29th Strategic Management 
Society Annual International Conferences. I would like to thank the 
anonymous reviewers and the participants at the conferences for their 
helpful comments and suggestions.
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Essay One:
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND DIVIDENDS
15
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the relatively unexplored relationship between 
dividends and ownership structure in an emerging market setting. Using a 
unique panel dataset of foreign ownership and firm attributes of listed 
Korean firms, we first characterize foreign ownership after the full capital 
market liberalization in 1998. Foreign investors in Korea tend to 
overweight larger and profitable firms with large export sales and 
underweight highly leveraged firms with low market-to-book ratio. Then 
we explore the effects of the rise in foreign ownership on dividend policies 
in Korea. Firms make higher dividend payouts as the shareholdings of 
foreigners increase. This result is consistent with the agency theory view of 
dividends, i.e. dividends can substitute for direct monitoring of firms by 
large external shareholders.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Several studies (e.g., Falkenstein, 1996; Kang and Stulz, 1997; Gompers 
and Metrick, 2001; Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Chan et al., 2005) have 
examined the preferences of institutional investors. Kang and Stulz (1997) 
find that foreigners investing in Japan tend to underweight smaller and 
highly leveraged firms. They argue that foreigners invest in firms that they 
are better informed about to reduce the costs associated with informational 
asymmetries. As Kang and Stulz, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) find 
foreign owners of Swedish firms show a preference for large firms, firms 
paying low dividends, and firms with large cash positions on their balance 
sheets.
However, we have limited understanding of holdings of foreign 
investors in emerging markets. This study deepens the understanding of 
foreign investors by identifying firm attributes that are common to foreign 
shareholdings in the Korean stock market. Korea, an emerging market that 
opened its doors to foreign investors following the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, serves as an excellent case study on changes in dividends and 
ownership structure. Variations in dividends and ownership structure are 
hard to observe as Myers (1984) documents that dividends are, for 
unknown reasons, "sticky" (have low variation over time and resistance to 
change), and ownership changes are difficult to document (La Porta et al., 
1999). By analyzing the repeated observations for all non-financial firms 
listed in Korea during period 1998-2003, we explore the panel variation in 
share ownership and firm characteristics.
We find following results: foreign investors in Korea tend to 
overweight larger, profitable firms with large export sales, and
17
underweight highly leveraged firms with low market-to-book ratio. 
Consistent with the traditional agency theory of dividends where it is 
argued that dividends can substitute for other monitoring devices (Rozeff, 
1982; Easterbrook, 1984), we also find that the level of foreign ownership is 
positively associated with dividend payouts, controlling for various firm 
characteristics.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the rise in 
foreign ownership in Korea following the full market liberalization in 1998. 
In Section 3, we outline previous empirical evidence on ownership 
preferences and characterize foreign ownership in individual Korean firms 
for the period 1998-2003. In Section 4, after reviewing the literature on 
ownership and dividend policy, we provide a brief overview of the 
dividend policy trends in Korea. Section 5 reports and discusses empirical 
results on the determinants of dividends using panel probit and Tobit 
estimations. Section 6 discusses the potential endogeneity issues and 
provides further robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
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2. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP IN KOREA
2.1. Stock Market Liberalization
The Korean government "traditionally" controlled all the internal and 
global financial capital flows very tightly (Chang, 1993). Although formal 
financial liberalization can be traced back to the 1980s, these reforms were 
"cautious and slow in terms of ... order and speed" (Park, 1996, p.252). The 
Korean government only started relaxing its control over the financial 
sector from the early 1990s as a consequence of Korea's economic success 
(Chang et al., 1998). Korea's securities market was opened to foreign 
investment for the first time in 1992 as foreign investors were allowed to 
own directly up to 3% of a publicly traded company with an aggregate 
limit of 10% for all foreign investors on an individual stock.
Table 1.1 shows the chronology of the individual and aggregate foreign 
investment ceilings for listed companies. The investment ceiling was 
gradually relaxed until 1997 as the Korean government's timetable for 
intended full liberalization was set for the end of 2000 (The Korea Securities 
Dealers Association, 2002). However, with the sudden onset of the 
financial crisis in 1997, the liberalization process and market opening 
accelerated following the International Monetary Fund (IMF) directives set 
in December 1997. The investment ceilings on listed companies were 
completely removed by May 1998.1
1 Except for some government-regulated companies (e.g., Korea Tobacco and Ginseng 
Co., Korea Electric Power, Korea Gas Corporation) which have a 40% aggregate limit 
for foreign investors.
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Table 1.1. Stock Market Opening Process
Date Individual Limit Aggregate Limit
January, 1992 3% 10%
December, 1994 3% 12%
July, 1995 3% 15%
April, 1996 4% 18%
October, 1996 5% 20%
May 1997 6% 23%
November 1997 7% 26%
December 1997 50% 55%
May 1998 100% 100%
The table shows the investment restrictions for foreign ownership. The first column shows 
the dates for "Securities and Exchange Act" reforms relaxing the investment ceiling for 
foreign investment in listed companies. The second and third columns show the investment 
limitations for foreign individual and aggregate ownership, respectively.
2.2. Foreign Investors in Korea: A first look
All "foreign investors"2 are required to register (directly or through a 
proxy) with the Korean Financial Supervisory Service (FSS). This 
registration is required for foreigners investing in domestic securities 
including stocks, bonds, trust funds, stock index futures, stock index 
options and commercial papers. The Korean FSS tracks ownership of all 
publicly traded securities and publishes data on a yearly basis which can be 
obtained from the Korea Information Service Corporation.3 Our dataset 
includes all non-financial Korean firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange
2 The Korean Financial Supervisory Service refers to "foreign" as an individual of 
foreign nationality; a corporation established under foreign laws; a government or 
public entity of a foreign country; or an international financial organization or 
association established by a treaty.
3 FSS started to provide this data publicly from 1998 but discontinued the service in 
2003.
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and KOSDAQ Stock Market from 1998 to 2003.4 For each firm, we have the 
percentage of total equity held by foreign investors at the end of each year. 
Our unbalanced panel data has repeated observations for a minimum of 
608 firms in 1998 and a maximum of 1,111 firms in 2003.
In 1998, there were 8,480 foreign investor registered with the Korean 
Financial Supervisory Service. U.S. and U.K investors comprised almost 
half of the registered foreign investors and their combined market value 
exceeded 60% of total foreign investors' market capitalization. The 
Financial Supervisory Service also reports that among these foreign 
investors, more than 65% were financial institutions and their market 
values accounted for 99.7% of the total foreign investor's market 
capitalization.5 Therefore, we estimate that U.S. and U.K. financial 
institutions comprise about sixty per cent of the total value of foreign 
investment in Korea.
2.3. Foreign Ownership and the Korean Stock Market
The increased presence of foreign ownership in the Korean stock 
markets is shown in Figure 1.1. The white bars in Figure 1.1 show the 
aggregate market capitalization of the firms during the period 1998-2003. 
The gray-coloured part of the bars illustrates foreign ownership in terms of 
market value. During this period, the portion of foreign ownership in the 
Korean market increased from 18.7% to 38.2% of total market capitalization.
4 We exclude financial firms because financial data for financial firms are not 
comparable to those of nonfinancial firms (e.g. La Porta et al, 2002). In addition, many 
financial firms were the first to go through restructuring following the 1997 financial 
crisis. Many de-listings, mergers, privatizations, and foreign LBOs limit data collection.
5 The rest, 0.3% of total foreign investors' market capitalization, is held by foreign 
individual investors.
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Their market value has increased from 16.90 trillion Korean won in 1998 to 
over 100 trillion Korean won in 2003.6
Figure 1.1. Foreign Ownership in the Korean Stock Market
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The figure shows foreign ownership in the Korean stock market on a 
yearly basis over the period 1998-2003. The bars depict the total market 
capitalization of the Korean stock market as well as foreign investors' 
share in the Korean stock market (gray bar). Both total market value and 
the foreign ownership value are expressed in terms of trillion Korean Won 
( W )  and are reflected on the left scale. The fluctuating line in the figure 
shows yearly observations of Korea's weight in the world market over the 
period 1997-2004, reflected on the right scale.
6 W100 trillion (KRW) is approximately equal to $83 billion (USD) (using the exchange 
rate quoted at the end of year 2003). To put this figure into perspective, in 2003, 
Microsoft Corporation was the world's largest company by market capitalization with 
$264 billion.
1 .2%
! Korea's weight in 
w orld stock mark< 
(right scale) J
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The fluctuating line illustrates Korea's weight in the global stock 
market.7 At the end of 1997, Korea's market capitalization only accounted 
for about 0.2 per cent of total world stock market capitalization. Seven 
years later, Korea's weight in the world market increased to more than one 
per cent of world's total market capitalization. From 27th largest in 1997 by 
market capitalization, Korea became the 14th largest out of 56 stock 
exchanges around the world in 2004.
2.4. Foreign Ownership by Industry
Table 1.2 provides a summary of foreign ownership by industry at the 
end of 2003. Our sample can be classified into 41 industries by two-digit 
Korean Standard Industry Classification (KSIC). We present the summary 
for the ten largest industries by market capitalization. The first two 
columns present the number and the market capitalization of the firms in 
each industry. The largest industry category is "Electronic and 
Communication Equipment" with market capitalization of 95.5 trillion 
Korean Won. The 148 firms in this industry account for about 35.1% of the 
total market capitalization in our sample. The second and third largest 
industries are manufacturers of "Motor Vehicles" and "Basic Metals", at 
about 8.5% and 7.2%, respectively.
Columns three and four report the presence of foreign ownership for 
each industry. 46.1% of foreign investment is allocated to the "Electronic 
and Communication Equipment" industry. Among the 148 firms in this 
industry, 119 firms (80.4%) have positive foreign ownership.
7 Korea's weight in the global stock market is calculated as the ratio of total market 
capitalization of Korean companies to the total market capitalization of the world's 56 
stock exchanges (data source: World Federation of Exchanges).
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Table 1.2. Foreign Ownership in the Korean Stock Market, by Industry
Firms in Industry Firms with Foreign Ownership
Industry N MCAP 
(in %)
N
(in %)
MCAP
(in%)
Electronic & Communication Equipment 148 95.5 119 47.93
(35.1) (80.4) (46.1)
Motor Vehicles 47 23.1 36 9.52
(8.5) (76.6) (9.2)
Basic Metals 58 19.6 37 10.66
(7.2) (63.8) (10.2)
Utilities 10 16.4 9 4.23
(6.0) (90.0) (4.1)
Chemicals 126 15.9 103 3.45
(5.8) (81.7) (3.3)
Telecommunications 10 14.9 6 6.57
(5.5) (60.0) (6.3)
Professional Services 36 14.9 28 4.65
(5.5) (77.8) (4.5)
Wholesale Trade 67 10.0 47 0.96
(3.7) (70.1) (0.9)
General Construction 45 7.8 35 2.04
(2.9) (77.8) (2.0)
Transportation Equipment 7 7.6 6 2.23
(2.8) (85.7) (2.1)
Others 557 46.8 396 11.79
(17.2) (71.1) (11.3)
All 1111 272.3 822 104.0
(100.0) (74.0) (100.0)
The table shows foreign ownership by industry on the Korean stock markets in 2003. The 
first two columns show the total number of firms (N) and the total market capitalization 
(MCAP) in trillion Korean Won. The percentage of an industry's capitalization to total 
market capitalization is shown in parentheses. The third column shows the number of firms 
with positive ownership and corresponding percentage to the total number of firms in the 
industry. The last column presents the market capitalization of foreign ownership in the 
industry with the percentage of total foreign ownership shown in parentheses.
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2.5. Top Holdings of Foreign Investors
Table 1.3 provides a summary of top ten holdings of foreign ownership 
in 2003. The second column presents the two-digit industry classification. 
The next three columns present the firm's foreign ownership, total market 
capitalization and foreign ownership as a percentage of total market 
capitalization. Samsung Electronics is the largest company in the portfolio 
held by foreign investors. Foreign investors control 60 per cent of the 
company with a corresponding investment of 40.85 trillion Korean won. 
The second and third largest companies held by foreign investors are 
POSCO and Hyundai Motor Company. The holdings are consistent with 
Merton (1987)'s observation that investors invest in the securities they 
know as these companies are well known companies in the global market.8 
As seen in the table, all top ten holdings are very large companies. It 
indicates that foreign investors seem to hold more shares in large firms. 
We have also checked this pattern of the data for the whole sample period 
(1998-2003), and found the same pattern for all years. Foreigners' 
preference for large firms seems to be robust both over time and industries.
8 POSCO is the world's second largest steel maker by market value. Hyundai Motor 
Company is the world's fourth largest automaker in terms of units sold.
Table 1.3. Top 10 Holdings by Foreign Investors in 2003
Company Industry
Foreign MCAP 
(trillion W)
Total MCAP 
(trillion W)
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
Samsung Electronics Electronic and Communication Equipment 40.85 68.03 60.0%
POSCO Basic Metals 9.64 14.50 66.5%
Hyundai Motor Company Motor Vehicles 6.08 11.09 54.8%
KT Corp. Telecommunications 5.78 12.70 45.5%
Korea Electronic Power Utilities 3.97 13.70 29.0%
LG Electronics Electronic and Communication Equipment 2.75 8.18 33.6%
Samsung SDI Electronic and Communication Equipment 2.50 6.53 38.3%
Shinsegae Retail 2.19 4.31 50.9%
Hyundai Mobis Motor Vehicles 1.86 5.44 34.3%
SK Corp. Professional Services 1.51 3.48 43.5%
The table shows foreign owners' top ten holdings in Korea by market capitalization. First column shows the two-digit KSIC industry classification. 
Second column shows the foreigners' share in terms of market value. The last column shows the percentage of foreigner's market value to total market 
capitalization.
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3. FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND FOREIGN 
OWNERSHIP
3.1. Existing Empirical Findings
Existing empirical studies have observed some patterns in stock 
preferences of different types of investors. The first comprehensive 
documentation of stock holders7 preferences is by Falkenstein (1996). 
Using cross-sectional data of U.S. mutual fund equity holdings for the 
period 1991-1992, Falkenstein shows that mutual funds have a significant 
preference for stocks with high visibility and low transaction costs, and 
avoid stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility.
Taking the same approach, Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that 
during the period 1980-1996, American institutional investors (with more 
than $100 million) invested in stocks that are larger, more liquid and have 
had relatively low returns in the previous year. On the other hand, recent 
literature has shown that smaller firms with low debt, low insider 
ownership, high profits and high cash reserves are targets for hedge funds 
in U.S. stock market (Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009) and similar 
stock characteristics are sought by activist (mainly U.S. and U.K.) hedge 
funds in Japanese firms (Buchanan, Chai and Deakin, 2009).
Non-U.S. studies have focused on the holdings of foreign investors. For 
example, Kang and Stulz (1997) examine the foreign investor (non-Japanese) 
preference for Japanese firms for the period 1975-1990 and show that 
foreign investors tend to invest in large, financially solid, and well-known 
firms. Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) find that foreigners (non-Swedes) 
in the Swedish stock market prefer large firms, firms paying low dividends, 
and firms with large cash holdings for the period 1993-1997. Covrig et al.
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(2006) find these preferences for large and globally well-known firms to be 
consistent for foreign mutual fund managers from 11 developed countries. 
In addition, Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that foreign institutions in 27 
countries tend to overweight firms with good governance and those cross­
listed in the U.S.
3.2. Firm Characteristics
In this section, we characterize FOREIGN OWNERSHIP (measured as 
the percentage of shares owned by foreign investors) using our dataset of 
ownership and firm attributes of Korean firms. The following firm 
characteristics are chosen to enable easy comparisons with the existing 
studies.
(i) FIRM SIZE: Firm size is measured as natural log of total assets
(ii) LEVERAGE: This capital structure variable measures long-term 
financial distress. It is calculated as total debt divided by total 
assets.
(iii) MARKET-TO-BOOK: Market-to-book ratio is a valuation 
measure of the firm. It is defined as the market value divided 
by the book value of equity. Low ratios are referred to as "value 
firms" while "growth firms" have higher ratios.
(iv) ROA: Return on assets is measured as net income divided by the 
book value of total assets.
(v) EXPORT INTENSITY: Export intensity is measured as export 
sales divided by total sales. It is a proxy measure to test 
Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis: overseas
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investors will be more familiar with firms with large sales 
abroad (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001).
(vi) DIVIDEND PAYOUT: Dividend payout ratio is defined as the 
value of (cash) dividends paid divided by net income
3.3. Empirical Results
In this section, we examine the investment behaviour of foreign 
ownership in Korea. To analyze the relations between foreign ownership 
and the different firm characteristics, we run multivariate Tobit regressions. 
We use the censored regression model proposed by Tobin (1958) to adjust 
for potential biases that may be caused by the prevalence of zero foreign 
ownership observations in the sample (Heckman, 1979).9 The estimations 
are carried out on a year-by-year basis from 1999 to 2003, as well as in a 
panel regression.
The regression results are reported in Table 1.4. The numbers of left- 
censored firms which have zero foreign ownership are reported. In 1999, 
there were 230 firms without any foreign ownership which is equivalent to 
38% of firms in the stock exchange.
We find positive and statistically significant coefficients for FIRM SIZE 
and MARKET-TO-BOOK for all years. The coefficients for LEVERAGE are 
negative and statistically significant for most of the years. EXPORT 
INTENSITY is only marginally significant at 10% for some years. The 
relationship between previous year's DIVIDEND PAYOUT and FOREIGN 
OWNERSHIP is not significant for 1999 to 2002. We only find a positive
9 OLS estimations or truncated estimations using sample firms with only positive 
foreign ownership may create various problems. See Wooldbridge (2002) for more 
discussion.
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and significant relationship between previous year's DIVIDEND PAYOUT 
and FOREIGN OWNERSHIP for the last year (2003) of our sample.
In the panel regression, we confirm the individual year results. We find 
statistical significance for size, market-to-book ratio and leverage ratio.
3.4. Robustness Check
Another way to measure the presence of significant ownership is to 
identify the investors with at least 5 per cent ownership. This indicator for 
a significant or large shareholding block has been widely used to study 
corporate ownership (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Claessens et al., 2000; 
Hoskisson et al., 2002). In this section, for robustness purposes, we provide 
further evidence of the determinants of significant foreign ownership using 
a probit regression analysis.
Table 1.5 reports the results of our probit estimations using the same set 
of independent variables as in Table 1.4. The results are similar to the Tobit 
estimations reported in Table 1.4. The coefficients for FIRM SIZE are 
significant at the 0.1% level for all individual years in our sample. In the 
panel regression, the probability of a presence of five per cent or more 
foreign ownership appears to be positively influenced by previous year's 
FIRM SIZE and EXPORT INTENSITY, and negatively by LEVERAGE.
In this regression, we find stronger support for the firm recognition 
hypothesis as EXPORT INTENSITY is positive and significant for most of 
the sample years. Merton (1987) argues that investors simply prefer 
familiar firms and Huberman (1999) shows that familiarity also breeds 
investment. Our finding is consistent with Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) 
who find that foreign investors prefer export oriented firms in their 
Swedish sample.
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Another noteworthy pattern in Table 1.5 is the magnitude of 
DIVIDEND PAYOUT coefficient changes shown in the year-by-year cross- 
sectional estimations. The DIVIDENT PAYOUT coefficient is -0.52 and 
significant at 5% level in 1999. The coefficients gradually increase to a 
significant and positive value of 0.16 in 2003. These interesting results are 
further discussed in the later sections of this paper as we investigate the 
determinants of dividend policy in Korea during our sample period.
We also performed several more robustness checks on our results. 
The estimation results including the industry dummy variables also yield 
consistent results.
3.5. Foreign Ownership and Information Asymmetry
To sum up, foreign investors in Korea seem to prefer large firms with 
low leverage, high market-to-book ratio, and large export sales. The overall 
results are consistent with previous studies on foreign ownership (Kang 
and Stulz, 1997; Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001).
Foreign investors may prefer large and low leveraged firms because 
foreign investors are likely to find themselves less informed about local 
firms than domestic investors (e.g., Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Choe 
et al, 2005). Kang and Stulz (1997) argue that informational asymmetries 
are the driving force behind foreign investors' biases.
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Table 1.4. Determinants of Foreign Ownership: Tobit Regression
__________________________________________________________________________Dependent Variable: FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
Independent Variable___________________________ 1999_______________2000_______________2001_______________2002_______________2003______________ Panel
Intercept -24.75*** -20.77*** -24.39*** -25.40*** -27.27*** -16.41***
(-6.54) (-7.18) (-10.21) (-11.60) (-15.16) (-14.03)
FIRM SIZE (t-v 4.79*** 4.81*** 5.54*** 5.16*** 6.01*** 3.90***
(9.97) (9.76) (14.35) (12.71) (1924) (16.54)
LEVERAGE (t-i) -5.06 -8.77** -9.49 *** 0.36 -3.01* -1.11**
(-1.39) (-2.92) (-4.15) (1.05) (-2.14) (-2.65)
MARKET-TO-BOOK (t-v 12.16*** 0.36* 4.79*** 5.47*** 9.72*** 0.27***
(5.07) (2.16) (4.67) (6.35) (9.82) (3.13)
ROA (t-v -0.55 6.18 3.23 1.99 -1.18 -0.07
(-0.13) (1.38) (0.92) (1.44) (-1.21) (-0.17)
EXPORT INTENSITY a-v 3.25 4.25 + 2.76 0.53 2.30 + 1.59
(1.43) (1.69) (1.60) (0.36) (1.64) (1.51)
DIVIDEND PAYOUT (t-v -1.23 -0.06 1.21 0.71 1.64* 0.27
(-1.20) (-0.06) (1.35) (0.71) (2.09) (0.71)
Pseudo R2 (%) 3.41 325 4.92 4.48 5.06
F-Statistics 20.66*** 17.37*** 50.42*** 28.45*** 50.42***
Wald x2
Left-Censored Observations 230 274 320 258 289
291.59***
1371
Uncensored Observations 378 429 508 712 822 2849
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
+Significant at the 10% level; * Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level; *** Significant at the 0.1% level
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Table 1.5. Determinants of Foreign Ownership: Probit Regression
Dependent Variable: 1 if  FOREIGN OWNERSHIP >5% and 0 if FOREIGN OWNERSHIP <5
Independent Variable 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Panel
Intercept -2.43*** -2.39*** -2.75*** -3.16*** -3.03*** -4.31***
(-7.05) (-9.32) (-11.34) (-13.37) (-14.40) (-15.19)
FIRM SIZE <t-v
0.42*** 0.36*** 0.46*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.69***
(8.70) (7.82) (10.37) (11.60) (13.77) (13.39)
LEVERAGE (t-v
-1.21** -0.70 -1.11*** -0.61 + -0.70** -1.42***
(-2.94) (-1.48) (-3.96) (-1.94) (-2.96) (-6.20)
MARKET-TO-BOOK (t-v
0.89*** 0.02 + 0.30** 0.37*** 0.65*** 0.02
(3.78) (1.65) (2.65) (4.62) (6.13) (1.08)
ROA (t-v
-0.60 0.80 0.46 0.61 0.00 0.11
(-1.15) (1.81) (1.11) (1.62) (0.08) (1.10)
EXPORT INTENSITY (t-v 0.32 0.39* 0.32 + 0.09 0.35* 0.52*
(1.62) (2.07) (1.80) (0.53) (2.36) (2.54)
DIVIDEND PAYOUT (t-v -0.52* -0.21 0.02 0.04 0.16* 0.03
(-2.07) (-0.94) (0.25) (0.50) (2.26) (0.34)
Pseudo R2 (%) 19.71 15.67 17.81 18.55 19.71
Wald x2 237.13***
Number of Observations 608 703 828 970 1111 4220
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Significant at the 10% level; * Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level; *** Significant at the 0.1% level
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4. DIVIDENDS AND FOREIGN OWNERSHIP
4.1. Dividends and Agency Theory
Since Modigliani and Miller's seminal studies (1958, 1961) showing the 
irrelevance of dividend policy, there has been a considerable amount of 
research identifying the rationale and determinants of corporate dividend 
policy. Agency theory is the most frequently cited explanation for the 
dividend puzzle. In adopting the agency theory argument of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Rozeff (1982) constructs a model in which dividends serve 
as a mechanism to reduce agency costs by distributing cash resources to 
shareholders. Easterbrook (1984) argues that by distributing resources in 
the form of cash dividends, firms' internal funds become inadequate which 
forces managers to seek external finance which is more effective than 
internal finance with respect to monitoring and disciplining management.
Rozeff argues that dividends provide indirect control benefits in the 
absence of active monitoring of a firm's management by its shareholders. 
According to this view, managers' and shareholders' interests are 
potentially in conflict in regards to dividend payments. Jensen (1986) 
argues that managers are reluctant to pay out dividends as they tend to act 
in their own interests, preferring instead to retain resources under their 
control. Easterbrook argues that outside shareholders have the opposite 
view of dividends. He argues that by virtue of their voting power, external 
shareholders may counter a tendency for managers preferring the excessive 
retention of cash flow. External shareholders who are likely to be exploited 
(La Porta et. al., 2002) can exert pressure on firms to pay out dividends.
Dividends potentially reduce agency costs and information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders (e.g., Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock,
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1985). By paying dividends, firms undergo a market audit which serves to 
motivate managers to both reveal new information and reduce agency costs 
in order to secure future funds. Moh'd et al., (1995) argue that shareholders 
value this benefit of reducing both agency costs and information 
asymmetries as the benefit of monitoring exceeds the cost of new funding.
4.2. Review of Empirical Evidences
Recent empirical studies have emphasized the relationship between 
ownership and dividend policy. Short et al. (2002), and Grinstein and 
Michaely (2005) find that large shareholders, especially financial 
institutions, have a preference for cash dividends. Mancinelli and Ozkan 
(2006) find further support for this positive relationship between large 
shareholders and dividends in Italian firms.
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) argue that the identity of the large 
shareholders, whether they are insider or external shareholders, is 
important. Truong and Heaney (2007) using a large number of firms from 
37 countries argue that firms are more likely to pay dividends when the 
largest shareholder is not an insider. Using the U.K. panel dataset, Khan 
(2006) shows that a positive relationship exists for insurance ownership 
and dividends in large firms.
Empirical evidence on the relationship between foreign ownership and 
dividends is rather limited as many empirical studies on foreign ownership 
treat dividend payouts as an exogenous variable to ownership. Dahlquist 
and Robertsson (2001) find that foreign investors in Sweden prefer firms 
paying low dividends while Covrig et al. (2006) find that foreign fund 
managers have no preference for high dividends.
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4.3. Worldwide Dividend Trends
Figure 1.2 shows the mean dividend payout ratios for large industrial 
companies from the world's major stock exchanges.10 The average 
dividend payout ratio has fallen during this period 1998-2003 for all major 
exchanges except for Korea and EURONEXT. The average dividend 
payout ratio for the industrial stocks from the New York Stock Exchange 
was about 16% while the average industrial stocks listed in Korea Stock 
Exchange was about 20% during the sample period.
However, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (henceforth 
LLSV, 2000) argue that differences in dividend policy can be explained by 
the different levels of legal protection of minority shareholders. They find 
higher dividends in common law countries (where legal protection is 
generally higher) and argue that "dividends are an outcome of effective 
legal protection of shareholders, which enables minority shareholders to 
extract dividend payments from corporate insiders" (LLSV, 2000, p.27). In 
supporting the agency approach of dividends, LLSV argue that dividends 
can serve as a substitute for effective legal protection for external 
shareholders.
10 Large Industrials are companies that belong to Industry Classification Benchmark 
code of "2000".
Figure 1.2. Global Comparison of Dividend Payout Ratio
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The figure shows the time trend (1998-2003) of mean dividend payout ratios for 
Industrial stocks (Industry Classification Benchmark = 2000) from the world's major 
stock exchanges and Korea. Dividend payout ratio is calculated as the ratio of 
value of cash dividends paid to net income.
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4.4. Increasing Dividends in Korea
The concept of dividend payments, returning cash to investors, is a 
relatively new financial concept in Korea. However, the total value of cash 
dividends paid out in the Korean stock market has dramatically risen over 
the period 1998-2003.
Contrary to Fama and French (2001)/s finding of "disappearing" 
dividends in the U.S., we find the dividend payments rising in Korea. In 
Figure 1.3, the bars show the aggregate value of cash dividends paid to all 
shareholders. During the period 1998-2003, the aggregate value of 
dividends paid has increased from 1.27 trillion to 5.84 trillion Korean Won.
Another new phenomenon in the Korean stock market during this 
period is the rise of foreign ownership as we have discussed in the earlier 
sections. The fluctuating line illustrates foreign investor's weight in the 
Korean stock market. Foreign investors' portions in the Korean stock 
market have increased from 18.7 per cent in 1998 to over 38 per cent of total 
market values in 2003.
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Figure 1.3. Total Dividend Payments and Foreign Ownership in the Korean
Stock Market
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The figure show s the rise in dividends and foreign ownership on a year- 
by-year basis over the period 1998-2003. The bars depict the aggregate 
value of dividend paym ents m ade to all shareholders in the Korean stock 
market, reflected on the left scale. The fluctuating line in the figure show s  
the yearly observations of foreign investors' w eight in the Korean stock  
market, reflected on the right scale.
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5. DETERMINANTS OF DIVIDENDS
In this section, we conduct various empirical analyses of the 
relationship between foreign ownership and firms' dividend policy. We 
focus on two decisions involving dividend policy: (1) whether or not to pay 
dividends, and (2) how much to pay.
5.1. Measuring Dividends
We have several dependent variables that measure firms' dividend 
policy.
DIVPAY: Dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that have non-zero 
dividends and 0 otherwise
DTV/SALES: Ratio of total cash dividends to net sales 
DIV/TA: Ratio of total cash dividends to book value of total assets. 
DIV/NI: Ratio of total cash dividends to net income, also known as 
dividend payout ratio.
The most commonly used measure of dividends is dividend payout 
ratio, (DIV/NI). However, Khan (2006) argues that scaling dividends by 
total sales rather than net income is preferred because of the non-zero or 
non-negative property of total sales. The ratio of dividends to total assets 
has also been used in the recent literature (LLSV, 2000; Grinstein and 
Michaely, 2005). To ensure that our results are not driven by the scaling 
factor of dividends, we repeat our estimations using all of these dividend 
measures.
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Figure 1.4. Time Trend of Dividend Measurements
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The figure show s the time trend of our dependent variables over the 
period 1998-2003. The bars depict the number of firms paying dividends 
(DIVPAY) in Korean stock market, reflected on the right scale. The 
fluctuating lines in the figure show  the yearly observations of d ividends to 
sales (DIV/SALES), and dividends to total assets (DIV/TA) ratios, reflected 
on the left scale.
Figure 1.4 shows the time trend of our dependent variables for our 
sample period 1998-2003. The bars show the number of firms paying 
dividends (DIVPAY). The two fluctuating lines show the market mean 
value of DIV/SALES, and DIV/TA, over time. Firms in the Korean stock 
market, on average, returned less than 1% of their total sales to 
shareholders in 1998. This ratio increases over time. In 2003, firms
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returned on average more than 1.5% of their total sales to shareholders as 
cash dividends.
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Table 1.6. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 DIVPAY 0.600 0.490
2 DIV/SALES 0.009 0.016 0.461*
3 DIV/TA 0.007 0.010 0.611* 0.721*
4 DIV/NI 0.179 0.465 0.315* 0.235* 0.262*
5 FIRM SIZE 4.616 1.481 0.151* -0.006 -0.059* 0.068*
6 LV 0.520 0.610 -0.172* -0.151* -0.166* -0.047* 0.055*
7 MB 0.566 1.779 0.001 0.083* 0.090* -0.009 -0.128* -0.071*
8 ROA 0.003 0.499 0.133* 0.077* 0.112* 0.030* 0.032* -0.166* 0.026
9 FOREIGN (%) 5.091 11.917 0.168* 0.113* 0.172* 0.066* 0.327* -0.040* 0.047 * 0.034*
Notes: * Significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test)
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5.2. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.6 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients. 
The table shows mean and standard deviations for all our dependent 
variables, firm characteristics variables, and foreign ownership variable 
discussed in the earlier section. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP is positively and 
significantly correlated with all dividend measures: DIVPAY (0.168), 
DIV/SALES (0.113), DIV/TA (0.172) and DIV/NI (0.066).
To provide an initial assessment of the differences between firms that 
pay dividends and do not, we compare the firm characteristics in Table 1.7. 
We have 3,196 observations for dividend paying firms (DIVPAY = 1) and 
2,135 observations for non-paying firm (DIVPAY = 0). Columns (1) and (2) 
report mean and median values for the firms that pay dividends. The next 
two columns report the same summary statistics for firms that do not pay 
dividends. Columns (5) and (6) report the univariate test results comparing 
the dividend paying and non-paying firms. The t-statistics for the mean 
differences and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for the median differences are 
given. The results show significant differences (at 0.1% level) between the 
groups in both mean and median for FIRM SIZE, LEVERAGE, ROA, and 
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP.
The summary statistics on FIRM SIZE, measured as the log of total 
assets, indicate that the dividend paying firms are larger than the firms that 
do not pay dividends. The next variable relates dividend policy to firm's 
capital structure. The average book value debt to total asset (LEVERAGE) 
is lower for the firms that pay dividends. The significant differences 
between firm's profitability measured, return on asset (ROA), indicates that 
the profitable firms pay higher dividends. Dividend paying firms also
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have higher valuation ratio, measured as the market-to-book ratio. 
However, the MARKET-TO-BOOK is only significant for its median values.
On the ownership differences, dividend paying firms have higher 
foreign ownership: an average of 6.726% foreign ownership (about 4 
percentage points higher than the firms do not pay dividends).
Table 1.7. D ividend Payers vs. Non-Payers
Summary Statistics Tests for Difference Between
DTVPAY=1 DTVPAY=0 the Groups
Mean Median Mean Median t-stat on Diff. Wilcoxon
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FIRM SIZE 4.799 4.531 4.342 4.057 11.183’”* 12.300***
LEVERAGE 0.435 0.442 0.649 0.599 -12.719*** -22.924***
MARKET-TO-BOOK 0.568 0.335 0.564 0.268 0.078 9.295***
ROA 0.057 0.047 -0.079 -0.017 9.828*** 39.465***
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 6.726 0.400 2.644 0.030 12.428*** 15.133***
Notes: The first two columns report the mean and median of the characteristics for the dividend paying firms. 
Columns 5 and 6 report the t-statistics for the average difference, and the Wilcoxon signed rank statistics for the 
median difference.
* Significant at the 5% level
** Significant at the 1% level
*** Significant at the 0.1% level
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5.3. To Pay or Not to Pay
We use a probit regression model for panel data to examine the role of 
foreign ownership in firms' decisions whether or not to pay. While 
controlling for the relevant firm characteristics presented in Fama and 
French (2001), we estimate the probability of firm's decision to pay 
dividends (DIVPAY=1). We also include year and industry dummy 
variables to control for industry effects and time effects across the sample.
The results of panel probit estimations are reported in Table 1.8. The 
regression results are consistent with those in Table 1.7. The results suggest 
that larger firms, firms with lower debt ratios, and firms with higher 
market-to-book ratio and return on assets (ROA) are more likely to pay 
dividends. The dividend decision is also related to foreign ownership. The 
estimated FOREIGN OWNERSHIP coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant (at 0.1 per cent level).
The third column reports the calculated marginal probability effects at 
the multivariate point of means. The marginal effects imply that a marginal 
change in foreign ownership from the sample average of 5.091% is 
associated with a 0.41 percentage point increase in the probability of firm 
paying dividends, other things equal. Overall, controlling for firm 
characteristics, we note that the greater the foreign shareholdings, the more 
likely firms are to pay dividends.
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Table 1.8. Panel Probit Analysis of Dividend Paying Firms
Dependent Variable: DIVPAY
Independent Variables Coefficient t-statistics Marginal Probability
Intercept 0.9194 1.22
FIRM SIZE 0.4841 *** 10.00 16.40%
LEVERAGE -4.3822 *** -17.08 -148.46%
MARKET-TO-BOOK 0.0345* 2.47 1.17%
ROA 0.1847 ** 3.31 6.26%
FOREIGN 0.0121** 3.27 0.41%
Industry Dummy Included ***
Year Dummy Included ***
Wald x2 446.43***
Number of Firms 1111
Number of Observations 5331
Notes: Industry dummies and year dummies are not reported but both are jointly significant.
* Significant at the 5% level; “ Significant at the 1% level; *** Significant at the 0.1% level
5.4. How Much to Pay?
We now investigate the levels of dividend payouts. We estimate the 
effects of firm characteristics and foreign ownership on three dividend 
payout ratios (DIV/SALES, DIV/TA, and DIV/NI). We use a panel Tobit 
model because the dividend distribution is censored from below at zero.11 
As we discussed in the previous section, about 40 percent of our sample 
firms do not pay dividends, thus showing a zero dividend ratio. Therefore, 
OLS estimates of coefficients might be inconsistent and biased towards zero 
(Greene, 1981). The Wald chi-square test indicates that all specifications of
11 Greene (2004) raises concern for "incidental parameters problem" in panel Tobit 
models. He finds a large positive finite sample bias when T  is very small (T=2 or 3). 
However, given our panel estimates are based on our sample year of T= 6, our estimates 
are less affected by the potential bias and inconsistency concerns (as Greene 
recommends T = 5 or more).
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all models are statically significant (at 0.1% level) as a whole. Industry 
dummies and year dummies are included as they are all jointly significant.
Table 1.9 reports the Tobit regression results. The results are 
consistent with the probit regression analysis reported in Table 1.8. We 
find positive and significant relationships between dividend payouts and 
FIRM SIZE, and ROA, suggesting that larger and profitable firms are more 
likely to pay higher dividends. The estimate coefficients for LEVERAGE in 
all models are negative and significant as expected. We also find that the 
coefficients for MARKET-TO-BOOK ratio are positive and significant 
(except for the model (3) where the dependent variable is DIV/NI).
These results are consistent with the existing empirical findings (e.g., 
Fama and French, 2001; Khan, 2006; Mancinelli and Ozkan, 2006; Truong 
and Heaney, 2007) except for the positive and significant relationship we 
find for MARKET-TO-BOOK ratio. Our results suggest that "growth firms" 
are more likely to pay higher dividends which may be paradoxical to our 
common understanding of dividends. However, this finding gives first 
empirical support to LLSV (2000)' s "agency substitution" theory that we 
expect high growth firms to have higher dividend payouts than low 
growth firms in countries with low shareholder protection.12
On the results regarding the foreign ownership, we consistently find 
positive and significant relationship between foreign ownership and the 
level of dividend payouts. These results can be interpreted as a support for
12 Korea's investor protection scores are relatively low. Korea's "cash flow rights," and 
"control rights" are scored at 0.18 and 0.24, respectively. Compared to 27 countries 
sample mean of 0.29 for "cash flow rights" and 0.39 for "control rights," Korea has one 
of the lowest scores (LLSV, 1998, 2002). However, Armour, Deakin, Lele and Siems 
(2009) criticize these cross-sectional studies of investor protection as they show legal 
rules evolve over time. For example, by using the time-series data of investor 
protection of 19 countries, Chai, Deakin, Sarkar and Singh (2009) provide first 
empirical evidences on the effects of investor protection on firm-level competition.
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our argument that higher level of foreign ownership is associated with 
more dividends. These results are consistent with the agency theory on 
dividends (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984).
Table 1.9. Panel Tobit Analysis on Dividend Payout Ratios13
Independent Variables
Dependent Variables
DIV/SALES DIV/TA DIV/NI
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.0150* 0.0126* 0.2000
(2.11) (2.55) (1.06)
FIRM SIZE 0.0028*** 0.0011*** 0.0855***
(6.8 7) (3.94) (7.65)
LEVERAGE -0.0496*** -0.0278*** -0.9942***
(-21.59) (-20.52) (-14.50)
MARKET-TO-BOOK 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0052
(4.18) (5.30) (0.97)
ROA 0.0027*** 0.0020*** 0.0619**
(4.12) (4.91) (2.88)
FOREIGN 0.0001** 0.0001*** 0.0020*
(2.73) (6.12) (2.07)
Industry Dummy Included *** Included *** Included ***
Year Dummy Included *** Included *** Included ***
Wald x2 727.29*** 760.65*** 392.95***
Number of Firms 1111 1111 1111
Left-censored Observations 2135 2135 2135
Uncensored Observations 3196 3196 3196
Notes: Industry dummies and year dummies are not reported but both are jointly significant; t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
* Significant at the 5% level; “ Significant at the 1% level; *** Significant at the 0.1% level
13 Decomposition analysis has been performed to demonstrate the relative importance 
of different explanatory factors. The variance of the dependent variable (DIV/TA) is 
explained by: FIRM SIZE (1.05%), LEVERAGE (11%), MARKET-TO-BOOK (0.4%), ROA 
(34.95%), FOREIGN (1.92%), Residuals (50.68%).
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5.5. Persistence of Dividends
Lintner (1956) argue that firms are reluctant to reduce cash dividend 
payments since it may be viewed as a negative signal of future 
performance. In order to allow for this concept of persistence or state 
dependence in dividend policy behaviour, we include past dividends in the 
above models.
Table 1.10 reports the dynamic Tobit regression results. The coefficient 
estimates for lagged dividends are large and significant for models (1) and
(2) where we use DIV/SALES and DIV/TA as the dependent variables. The 
size of the coefficient is consistent with the "dividend smoothing" 
behaviour noted by Lintner (1956) that firms adjust dividend payments 
gradually over time. However, in model (3) where we use DIV/NI as the 
dependent variable, the lagged DIV/NI is not significant.
Most importantly, the estimated results for all other determinants in 
our dividend models are consistent with the previous probit and Tobit 
regression analysis reported in Tale 1.8 and Table 1.9 even after controlling 
for the lagged dividends.
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Table 1.10. Dynamic Panel Tobit Analysis on Dividend Payout Ratios
Independent Variables
Dependent Variables
DIV/SALES DIV/TA DIV/NI
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.0094 0.0059 0.2527
(1.78) (1.83) (1.12)
Lagged Dividendsu 0.4582*** 0.5649*** -0.0252
(23.21) (21.95) (-0.98)
FIRM SIZE 0.0019 *** 0.0009*** 0.0887***
(6.05) (4.59) (6.38)
LEVERAGE -0.0325 *** -0.0183*** -1.0772***
(-16.17) (-14.86) (-12.67)
MARKET-TO-BOOK 0.0007* 0.0005* -0.0132
(2.09) (2.52) (-0.73)
ROA 0.0018*** 0.0012*** 0.0596*
(3.54) (3.95) (2.49)
FOREIGN 0.0001** 0.0001*** 0.0029*
(2.90) (5.20) (2.51)
Industry Dummy Included *** Included *** Included ***
Year Dummy Included *** Included *** Included ***
Wald x2 1458.84*** 1523.73*** 334.16***
Number of Firms 1111 1111 1111
Left-censored Observations 1692 1692 1786
Uncensored Observations 2528 2528 2434
Notes: Industry dummies and year dummies are not reported but both are jointly significant; t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.
* Significant at the 5% level; **Signifkant at the 1% level; *** Significant at the 0.1% level
14 DIV/SALES (t-v, DIV/TA a-v and DIV/NI a-v are used for model (1), (2) and (3), 
respectively.
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6. DISCUSSION OF POTENTIAL ENDOGENITY
In the previous section, like the existing studies on ownership and 
dividends (e.g., Rozeff, 1992; Easterbrook, 1984; Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003; 
Khan, 2006; Mancinelli and Ozkan, 2006), we have treated foreign 
ownership as exogenous variable in the dividend policy regressions. 
Recent research in strategy has also emphasized the impact of ownership 
on firm level strategy (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2002) 
and found strong evidence of the impact of ownership on international 
diversification (Tihanyi et al., 2003), R&D strategy (Baysinger et al., 1991), 
and corporate social responsibility (Johnson and Greening, 1999). In 
addition, the identity and preference of owners also have impact on small 
business growth in the short run (Johnson, Conway and Kattuman, 1999), 
and human resource management practices (Bryson, Gomez, and 
Kretschmer, 2007) in U.K.
However, there is equally convincing evidence supporting the 
argument that higher dividends induce increased shareholdings of 
institutional ownership (Grinstein and Michaely, 2005), largest 
shareholders (Truong and Heaney, 2007), and domestic funds (Covrig et al., 
2006). In addition, Allen et al. (2000) argue that firms paying dividends 
attract more institutional investors in the U.S. because dividends are taxed 
at lower rate or even untaxed for some institutions. However, this tax 
clientele effect does not apply in Korean stock markets as dividends can be 
taxed more for foreign investors depending on bilateral tax treaty 
agreements.15
15 Income tax withholding rates for the U.S. investors on dividends are 10 or 15%, and 
Capital gains are 0 or 11%, depending on the percentage of shares owned. The bilateral 
tax treaties between U.K. and Korea grants the U.K. investors of 0% tax rate on capital
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One possible way to tackle this potential endogeneity problem is to use 
instrumental variables methods like two-stage least squares (2SLS). 
However, finding valid instrumental variable(s) in corporate finance 
literature, especially for firm ownership are known to be difficult 
(Himmelberg et al., 1999). Nevertheless, to address the potential 
endogeneity effect, we first apply the Wu-Hausman specification test to test 
for endogeneity (Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978).16 Wu-Hausman test for 
exogeneity has been conducted for all dividend models and foreign 
ownership. The tests suggest that there is no significant endogeneity 
between them, allowing us to use the standard Tobit model over two-stage 
Tobit model.
In addition, our results presented in Section 3 and 9 do support our 
view that dividend outcomes are endogenously determined by exogenous 
foreign ownership. Table 1.4 reports that dividend payout at t-1 does not 
affect foreign ownership in the following year, at t. Yet, in Table 1.9 reports 
the finding that foreign ownership has positive and significant relationship 
with dividend payouts, controlling for relevant firm characteristics. These 
results suggest that it is indeed the presence of foreign ownership which 
increases dividends rather than high dividends increasing foreign 
ownership.
Lastly, we conduct a few more robustness checks to strengthen our 
argument. First, we take companies with significant increases in level of 
foreign ownership in the first years (1998-1999) of stock market opening 
and show that these companies do not have higher dividend ratios than the
gains and 5 or 15% tax on dividends. (Source: The National Tax Service (KOREA), as of 
January, 2002).
16 We thank Alan Hughes and the participants at the Centre for Business Research 
Corporate Governance seminars at University of Cambridge for their suggestions on 
how to better address the endogeneity issue.
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other companies. These comparisons are reported in Table 1.11. Those 
companies with significant increases in foreign ownership from 1998 to 
1999, on average, did not pay higher dividends than the other companies 
(i.e., the difference in mean and median values for these two groups are not 
statistically significant).
Table 1.11. Comparison of Significant Increases in  Foreign Ownership (1998- 
1999) and Others
Summary Statistics Tests for Difference Between
AFO (1999) >5% AFO (1999) <5% the Groups
Mean Median Mean Median t-stat on Diff Wilcoxon
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DIV/SALES nm) 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.004 1.666 1.832
DIV/TA (1999) 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.530 1.445
DIV/NI (1999) 0.198 0.093 0.171 0.108 0.572 0.458
Notes: The first two columns report the mean and median of the dividend variables for the firms that had 
significant increases in foreign ownership. Columns 5 and 6 report the t-statistics for the average difference, and 
the Wilcoxon signed rank statistics for the median difference.
* Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level; *** Significant at the 0.1% level
Table 1.12. Comparison of Significant Foreign Ownership in  2003 and Others
Summary Statistics______________  Tests for Difference Between
Variables
FO (2003) > 5% FO (2003) < 5% the Groups
Mean
(1)
Median
(2)
Mean
(3)
Median
(4)
t-stat on Diff Wilcoxon 
(5) (6)
DIV/SALES (2003) 0.014 0.010 0.007 0.0002 6.578 *** 9.263***
DIV/TA (2003) 0.012 0.010 0.006 0.0001 8.610*** 8.889***
DIV/NI (2003) 0.229 0.168 0.166 0 2.418* 5.867***
Notes: The first two columns report the mean and median of the dividend variables for the firms that have 
significant foreign ownership. Columns 5 and 6 report the t-statistics for the average difference, and the Wilcoxon 
signed rank statistics for the median difference.
* Significant at the 5% level; **Significant at the 1% level; *** Significant at the 0.1% level
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Then, we take companies with high levels of foreign ownership at the 
end of our sample period (year 2003), and show that these companies have 
higher dividend ratios than other companies. Table 1.12 shows that those 
firms with significant foreign ownership, measured as 5% or more foreign 
ownership, pay higher dividends than those firms with less than 5% of 
foreign ownership. On average, the firms with significant foreign 
ownership in 2003 have 1.3 to 2 times higher dividend ratios than the other 
firms.
These two simple exercises further support our argument that rises in 
foreign ownership in Korea led more firms to pay dividends and increase 
dividend payout levels.
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7. CONCLUSION
By using a rich panel dataset on foreign ownership and firm-specific 
attributes, we characterize foreign ownership in Korean firms with great 
detail. Foreign investors seem to prefer larger and export oriented firms 
with low leverage and high market-to-book ratio. Our findings are unique 
to other empirical studies that capture the stock preferences of investors as 
our data captures the investment behaviour of foreigners in relatively 
unknown, emerging, and recently liberalized stock market.
The study also contributes to the limited empirical literature on 
ownership structure and dividends in emerging markets. We find that 
dividend policy is a function of firm size, capital structure (measured as 
leverage ratio), valuation (measured as market-to-book ratio) and 
profitability (measured as return on assets). Most importantly, we find that 
foreign ownership has significant influence on dividend policy that the 
firm adopts.
Our results are consistent with the agency model of dividends 
argument set forth by Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984). In addition, 
the evidence of high dividend payouts in companies with high levels of 
foreign ownership in post-1997 financial crisis and subsequent market 
liberalization support the view that external shareholders extract dividend 
payments from corporate insiders as a substitute for effective legal 
protection (LLSV, 2000).
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Essay Two:
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND LABOUR COST
65
ABSTRACT
This study examines the impact of foreign ownership on the firm's labour 
cost using a panel data of 496 publicly traded Korean companies during the 
post Asian financial crisis period of 1998-2003. It shows that foreign 
ownership is positively related to labour cost but this positive effect is 
significantly weaker for firms with weak financial performance than those 
with strong financial performance. These results provide support to the 
view that foreign investors take both monitoring and disciplinary roles for 
publicly traded firms.
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The capacity o f  the new  Em ploym ent Insurance system  w ill he strengthened to 
facilita te  the redeploym ent o f  labor, in parallel w ith  furth er steps to im prove labor 
m arket flexib ility.
-  "Memorandum on the Economic Program" attached to the "Letter of Intent 
of the government of Korea" to the IMF, December 3,1997.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Korean labour market underwent employment restructuring 
following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and subsequent International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout. Conditions of the $65 billion IMF bailout 
were: the Korean government had to contain inflationary pressure through 
tight monetary and reduced fiscal policies, fundamentally reform the 
banking and financial sector and find a way to limit corporations' excessive 
reliance on short-term financing. Acceptance of the IMF's financial market 
liberalization demands led to a dramatic increase in equity ownership of 
publicly traded Korean firms by U.S. and U.K. institutional investors.1
The IMF particularly emphasized that the Korean labour market was 
too rigid and called for reforms to improve its flexibility. However, Kim 
and Bae (2004) argue that even without this pressure from the IMF, Korean 
government officials had already come to the conclusion that securing 
labour market flexibility was essential to improve the competitiveness of 
Korean corporations. Thus the Korean government encouraged firms to 
implement employment restructuring programs by reforming labour laws. 
These reforms allowed firms to dismiss workers based on firms' "urgent
1 In terms of market value, foreign investors' share in Korean equity markets increased 
from 14.6% in 1997 to over 40% in 2004.
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managerial need".2 Consequently, many firms adopted various and bold 
employment restructuring programs. As Kim and Kim (2003) document, 
some firms utilized the financial crisis as an opportunity to eliminate 
redundant labour forces encountering strong resistance.
Whether it was achieved by numerical flexibility (e.g. boosting early 
retirements while reducing work hours, overtime and recruitment) or by 
functional flexibility (e.g. salary freezes and reducing bonuses and benefits), 
the ultimate goal of late 1990s labour restructuring was to reduce 
expenditures on labour. Consequently, the unemployment rate in Korea 
rose sharply from 2.1 per cent in August 1997 to modem Korea's peak at 8.6 
per cent in February 1999.
Given this turbulent macro-economic environment, the purpose of this 
paper is to examine the explanatory factors of firm-level drivers of 
employment cost reduction and to shed some light on the impact of 
ownership structure on labour cost. Using a sample of 496 firms over the 
1998-2003 period, we empirically examine the impact of the (stronger) 
presence of U.S. and U.K. institutional investors on total labour cost.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we 
review existing empirical results and outline possible theoretical links 
between foreign ownership and labour cost. Section 3 reviews the 
downsizing methods and reports our results. Section 4 details the data 
and methodology for estimating the total labour costs. Section 5 provides 
descriptive evidence on the development of labour flexibility during 1998- 
2003, and empirically tests for the impact of foreign ownership on labour 
cost. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2 For more, see the discussions of Crotty and Lee (2002); Lee and Lee (2003).
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2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Traditional Employment Practices in Korea
Traditional Korean human resource management is characterized by 
the principles of seniority-based wage and long-term employment. Under 
the traditional long-term employment system, a recent graduate would be 
hired and trained internally to perform various jobs through rotations and 
transfers, and receive pay based on the length of service (Bae and Rowley, 
2001). In this system, there are no formal layoffs for permanent employees 
such as those evidenced in the US or European systems (Bae and Lawler,
2000).
This concept of "permanent employment" has been widely studied in 
the Japanese context (Dore, 1973; Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001). 
Although Korea's human resource management has limited arrangements 
compared to the "Japanese sense"3 (Kim and Bae, 2004), the long-term 
employment system has cultivated employees' loyalty and commitment to 
the firm (Rowley and Bae, 2002).
Yet, the financial crisis of 1997 led many managers to abandon their 
traditional employment practices including the permanent employment 
ideology. Faced with the urgency for corporate survival, most companies 
undertook bold restructuring and downsizing programs in an attempt to 
stay in business. Reforms took place in every dimension of human 
resource management from the recruitment and selection process to the 
revaluation of remuneration systems. As noted by Kim and Bae (2004,
3 For more detail discussion of traditional Japanese permanent employment practices, 
see Cole (1972).
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p.16), "most management lost their sense of direction, but retained a 
change-is-good mentality."
2.2. Downsizing Studies
As many Korean corporations abandoned their permanent employment 
practices, "downsizing", a relatively new concept in the Korean labour 
market, became a new phenomenon. Downsizing, more common in the 
Anglo-Saxon business models, is regarded as a strategic choice of 
permanent job cuts in an effort to improve operating efficiency in 
competitive circumstances, but not necessarily because of declines in 
business (Cascio, 1993; DeWitt, 1998). Freeman and Cameron (1993:12) 
further define downsizing as "a set of activities, undertaken on the part of 
the management of an organization, designed to improve organizational 
efficiency, productivity, and/or competitiveness. It represents strategy 
implemented by managers that affects the size of the firm's work and the 
work processes used." Based on these ideas, Yoshikawa et al. (2005) argue 
that employment is regarded as a discretionary expense and firms are 
constantly looking for ways to improve their operating efficiency.
It is also assumed that downsizing will lead to reduced costs and 
increased flexibility and ultimately improved profitability. Evidence of the 
actual effects of downsizing on profitability is hard to find, as the empirical 
work reports mixed results (Worrell et al., 1991; Lee, 1997; Cascio et al., 
1997; Wayhan and Werner, 2000; Chadwick et al, 2004).
In addition to the mixed results, many empirical downsizing studies 
share a critical limitation in defining what constitutes downsizing. The 
common indicator for downsizing is a dichotomous measure which takes a 
value of 1 if there is a significant workforce reduction (Cascio et al., 1997;
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Wayhan and Werner, 2000; Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001; Littler and 
Innes, 2004; Love and Nohria, 2005; Vincente-Lorente and Suarez-Fonzalez, 
2007). An employee reduction of 5 percent or more is widely accepted as 
significant downsizing as it is "more likely to occur through concentrated 
efforts to reduce the workforce than through attrition" (Ahmadjian and 
Robinson, 2001, p.632).
2.3. Foreign Ownership and Human Capital
Research based in agency-theory has raised the role of ownership in 
human capital investments (Blair and Roe, 1999; Yoshikawa et al., 2005). 
These studies demonstrate that owners play an important role in the 
shaping of resource allocation decisions as recent research has emphasized 
that owners are heterogeneous and have different preferences (Hoskisson 
et. al., 2002). However, there are only a few empirical papers that directly 
link foreign ownership to employment practices. Ahmadjian and Robinson 
(2001)'s Japanese study finds a positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and downsizing. Buchanan, Chai and Deakin (2009) argue that 
foreign activists hedge fund bring the notion of "shareholder capitalism" to 
their investments in Japan and demand immediate attention to shareholder 
value. Yoshikawa et al. (2005), also using Japanese data, find a negative 
relationship between foreign ownership and average wage. Yoshikawa et 
al. assert that compared to domestic owners, foreign owners have limited 
interest in safeguarding long-term human capital investments and are more 
likely to push for a reduction in wage to cut total labour costs.
The consensus of existing empirical evidence suggests that foreign 
institutional investors want labour flexibility to pursue their short-term 
financial objectives. Our analyses challenge the existing hypothesis and
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findings that more foreign ownership leads to downsizing or divestment of 
(human capital) assets. In this paper, we contribute to the limited findings 
in the literature by studying the unique phenomenon that took place post 
1997 financial crisis in Korea: the economic pressures to reduce labour cost 
and the rise in foreign ownership.
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3. DOWNSIZING
3.1. Method
The sample consisted of a pooled cross-sectional time series of data on 
430 publicly traded Korean firms collected from the KISVALUE database 
during the period of 1999-2004. We included only firms that were publicly 
listed in all years of this period. We excluded financial firms, and the firms 
with foreign ownership restrictions in place. From this sample, 31 firms 
were dropped due to missing dependent variable. The sample was 
categorized into 16 industries by the stock sector classification provided in 
the database. They include construction, machinery, non-metallic mineral 
products, services, textile and wearing apparel, fishery, transportation 
equipment, transport and storage, distribution industry, food and 
beverages, medical and precision machines, medical supplies, electrical and 
electronic equipment, paper and wood, iron and metal products, and 
chemical.
3.2. Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is a downsizing event defined as a decrease in 
the number of the permanent employees of 5 percent or more between year 
t-1 and year t. A dichotomous measure of downsizing has advantage over 
a continuous measure that captures both an increase and a decrease in 
employment for its easier interpretation in studying downsizing 
(Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001; Cascio et al., 1997; Suarez-Gonzalez, 2002). 
Changes of 5 percent or more are likely to be interpreted as concentrated 
efforts to reduce the workforce than as attrition (Ahmadjian and Robinson,
2001).
73
Freeman and Cameron (1993:12) defines downsizing as "a set of 
activities, undertaken on the part of the management of an organization, 
designed to improve organizational efficiency, productivity, and/or 
competitiveness. It represents strategy implemented by managers that 
affects the size of the firm's work and the work processes used." 
Consistent with this definition, Korean firms' downsizing in the post 1997 
financial crisis was a result of strategic managerial decisions to reduce 
employment.
3.3. Independent Variables
Firm size is the log of total assets (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001; 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002).
Return on assets (ROA) is a performance measure computed as the ratio 
of net income to total assets. ROA reflects firm's profitability in relation to 
the capital invested. Previous studies have found ROA to be a stable and 
reliable measure of firm performance (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002).
Sales growth is the percentage growth in sales between year t-1 and t 
(Huselid, 1995; Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001).
Foreign ownership is the percentage of total shares held by foreign 
owners. These measures have been used reliably in past studies (Kochnar 
and David, 1996; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002).
Chaehol is a dummy variable for firms that belong to one of the top-30 
chaebol groups (Black and et al., 2006).
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3.4. Model Specification
Our data consists of a panel of 430 firms observed over 5 years. The 
dependent variable is a downsizing event defined as a decrease in the 
number of the permanent employees of 2, 5, or 10 percent or more between 
year t and year t-1. We followed a variation of discrete-time event history 
methodology (Allison, 1984; Yamaguchi, 1991). We used a panel probit 
model to estimate the possibility of a downsizing event in a given year in a 
pooled sample of each organization observed during each of the five years:
P(t) = 0  [a + bixi(t-i) + e]
(3)
where P(t) is the probability of downsizing event occurring at time t and xi 
is a set of time-varying covariates.
3.5. Panel Probit Results
Table 2.1 presents the panel probit analyses results. We find negative 
and significant relationship between downsizing and return on assets 
(ROA), and foreign ownership. The results are contradictory with existing 
literature that suggests more foreign ownership leads to downsizing. In 
contrary to some existing studies that raise concerns for myopic pressures 
from foreign investors to downsize in an effort to cut costs, our results of 
do not support this view.
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Table 2.1. Panel Probit Analyses for Downsizing of 2%, 5%, and 10% or More
downsizing 2% downsizing 5% downsizing 10%
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3)
Intercept -0.829 -0.468 -0.457
(0.770) (0.698) (0.661)
Firm Size (t-1) 0.026 -0.020 0.030
(0.037) (0.033) (0.031)
Return on asset (t-1) -0.665*** -0.694*** -0.588***
(0.112) (0.182) (0.179)
Sales growth (t-1) -0.121 -0.299** -0.343**
(0.112) (0.107) (0.103)
Foreign ownership (t-1) -0.012** -0.012*** -0.011***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Chaebol group firms (t-1) -0.195 -0.168 -0.147
(0.122) (0.109) (0.100)
Industry controlled YES YES YES
Year controlled YES YES YES
Wald Chi2 121.23*** 143.40*** 120.29***
% of firms downsized 42.44% 35.84% 29.44%
Joint significance on 1 digit industry dummy: chi2(14) = 74.65*** 
Joint significance on year dummy: chi2(4) = 17.51**
Notes: N=2150 (balanced panel data on 430 firms x 5 years). Each equation contains unreported industry and 
year dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5% level
** Significant at the 1% level
*** Significant at the 0.1% level
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3.6. Limitations of Downsizing Studies
The limitation of this estimation is that the results only capture the 
changes in permanent employees as firms are only required to report the 
number of permanent employees. Reduction in total employee count can 
come from many means: reduction in hiring, early retirements, sending 
employees to affiliates and outright layoffs. Since our employment data is 
defined as the number of company workers as reported to shareholders in 
annual reports, we were unable to distinguish the types of downsizing. 
However, we know from anecdotal evidence that during our sample period, 
many firms have replaced permanent employees with part-time or 
contingent workers.
In the absence of specific information on the type of downsizing, effects 
on total labour costs are ambiguous. For example, if downsizing involved 
low-wage employees, average wage per employee will rise. Conversely, a 
reduction in high-wage employees will lower the average wage per 
employee.4 Firms' total labour cost can be reduced by cutting the wages of 
each employee and/or by laying off employees. Therefore, the empirical 
studies on downsizing do not allow us to draw any conclusions regarding 
its effects on labour cost. This can potentially produce inconsistent results 
in the Korean context as many firms encouraged early (honorary) 
retirement programs to replace permanent employees with a temporary or 
contingent workforce. The net effect on the number of employees is not 
clear, given the availability of several actions management can take to
4 The existing efficiency wage literature (e.g. Medoff, 1979; Yellen, 1984; Milgrom, 1988) 
has shown that firms (employees) choose (prefer) layoffs over across the board wage 
reductions. However, the Korean context may differ as some firms that implemented 
"work-hour reduction," and/or "work share" programs to avoid employee layoffs were 
often praised by the media (for an example, see Cho and Chang (2007)'s case study of 
Yuhan-Kimberly).
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reduce total labour costs (e.g. attrition, lay-offs, early retirements, voluntary 
severance programmes, divestures, reduction in hiring, sending employees 
to affiliates or spin-offs, etc...). This indicates that the dummy variable 
approach to downsizing may not be the optimal way to examine corporate 
labour restructuring.5 Given these potential limitations of downsizing 
studies discussed, in the next section, we focus on the determinants of total 
labour cost, defined as the sum of all direct labour expenditures.
5 However, the approach of using a dummy variable (converting a continuous variable 
(number of employees) to a binary variable (changes of 5% or not)) for downsizing can 
be more robust if "downsizing" events can be identified and confirmed by secondary 
sources such as newspapers or company statements (Love and Nohria, 2005).
78
4. LABOUR COST
4.1. Method
The relationship between foreign ownership and labour costs discussed 
in Section 2 are tested using firm-level panel data. Equation (1) describes 
the baseline model:
log(total labour Cost) u = a  + pi (foreign ownership)t-i
+ E pk (control variables) /, t-i + eu
(1)
where a is a constant; eu is the error term of firm i at time t; our primary 
coefficient of interest is the coefficient on foreign ownership, pi.
We adopt a lagged specification, examining the relationship between 
previous year's values of independent variables, and this year's total labour 
cost, in an effort to mitigate concerns of reverse causality. Similar 
specifications have been widely used in the finance literature to help infer 
causality (e.g., Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006).
4.2. Data
The data comes from the Korea Investors Services (Kisvalue-2) database 
which reports firm profile, financial information, and ownership 
information. The sample consists of panel data on 520 non-financial firms6 
listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) between 1998 and 2003. The 
imbalanced panel yields 2,332 firm-year observations. However, we have
6 We exclude financial firms because valuation ratios for financial firms are not 
comparable to those of nonfinancial firms (e.g. La Porta et al., 2002).
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24 firms with incomplete labour cost information, reducing the sample to 
496 firms.
4.3. Dependent Variable
Given the potential limitations of downsizing studies discussed in the 
previous section, we focus on the determinants of total labour cost, defined 
as the sum of all direct labour expenditures. It includes all salaries and 
wages, bonuses, severance and retirement grants, and stock option 
compensations to both executives and all employees including part-time 
and contingent workers. It captures the total amount of resources allocated 
to labour. Following the labour economics literature7, our dependent 
variable, log(total labour cost), is the natural log transformation of total 
labour cost.
4.4. Independent Variable
The independent variable of interest in our study is foreign ownership. 
Foreign ownership is defined as the percentage of shares held by non-Korean 
shareholders. The majority of these foreigners are US and UK institutional 
investors.8 With the recent availability of ownership data, such measures 
have been widely and reliably used in past studies (e.g., Chang, 2003).
4.5. Control Variables
Control variables introduced in Eq. (1) are firm size, Tobin's q, sales 
growth, firm age, and Chaebol group firm. Previous empirical research
7 Many empirical labour economics studies (e.g., Nickell and Bell (1996) and Dustmann 
et al. (2009)) use the log transformation to make the distribution of the wage variable 
more symmetric.
8 For detailed decomposition of foreign ownership, see Chai (2006).
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suggests these variables as predictors for executive compensation and 
downsizing.
Firm size is measure by the log of the book value of total assets. Tobin's 
q, is calculated as the total market value of equity divided by book value of 
total assets. Using Tobin' q, we control for the presence of growth 
opportunities as Mehran (1995) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) have found 
positive significant effects of lagged Tobin's q on executive compensation. 
Sales growth is calculated as the percentage of growth in total sales. 
Managers pay close attention to sales growth as a key business survival 
indicator in an uncertain business environment (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 
2001), and Huselid (1995) has found sales growth to be a significant factor 
influencing firms' human resource strategy. Firm age is measured as the 
number of years since the firm's establishment. However, the theoretical 
arguments for the role of firm age in human capital are inconclusive as 
there is contradictory empirical evidence.9
Chaebol group firm is an indicator variable which equals one if a firm 
belongs to the top-30 Chaebol business groups identified by the Korean Fair 
Trade Commission. Business groups are a collection of firms which are 
linked together by common ownership and interlocking family 
shareholdings. In a study of Korean Chaebol firms, Chang (2003) found that 
group companies serve as an organizational structure for appropriating 
quasi rents, which accrue from access to scarce and imperfectly marketed 
inputs such as capital and information. Groups can boost the profitability 
of member firms as they fill the voids left by the missing institutions that 
normally underpin the efficient functioning of product, capital, and labour
9 In downsizing study, Ahmadjian and Robinson (2001) find a negative relationship 
while Vicente-Lorente and Suarez-Gonzalez (2007) find a positive relationship between 
firm age and downsizing.
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markets (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Thus, Chaebol group firms, compared 
to non-Chaebol firms, may have more flexible tools and resources to resist or 
offer alternative solutions to capital market pressure.
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics. It shows the means and 
standard deviations of the sample firms' log(total labour cost) and lagged 
values of Tobin's q, Sales growth, foreign ownership, firm age, and Chaebol 
group firms. Our dependent variable, log(total labour cost), is significantly 
and positively correlated with lagged values of firm size (0.789), foreign 
ownership (0.313), firm age (0.212) and Chaebol group firms (0.448), and 
negatively correlated with Tobin's q (-0.113). Multicollinearity should not 
be a problem here as the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) was below 4 
for all variables in the regression model.10
Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
V ariables M ean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 logftotal labour cost) 2.212 1.523
2 Firm size (t-v 5.424 1.442 0.789 *
3 Tobin’s q (t-v 0.312 0.400 -0.113* -0.130*
4 Sales growth (%)<t-v 12.671 84.765 -0.033 -0.064* 0.089*
5 Foreign ownership (%)<t-v 6.594 12.819 0.313* 0.359* 0.226* -0.014
6 Firm age (t-v 33.695 12.846 0.200* 0.212* -0.199* -0.040* -0.136*
7 Chaebol group firms (t-v 0.206 0.405 0.448* 0.538* -0.020 -0.029 0.007 0.041 *
* Significant at the 5% level 
** Significant at the 1% level 
*** Significant at the 0.1% level
To provide an initial assessment of the differences between Chaebol 
group firms and non -Chaebol firms, we compare the firm characteristics in 
Table 2.3. Columns (1) and (2) report mean and median values for the
10 A commonly used rule of thumb for detecting multicollinearity is VIF value of 10 or 
more (Baum, 2006).
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Chaebol group firms. The next two columns report the same summary 
statistics for the non-Chaebol group firms. Columns (5) and (6) report the 
univariate test results comparing Chaebol and non-Chaebol firms. The t- 
statistic for the mean differences and the Wilcoxon signed rank statistics for 
the median differences are given. The results show significant differences 
between the groups in both mean and median total labour costs, firm size 
and foreign ownership. The average total labour cost for Chaebol group 
firms and non-Chaebol group firms are 115.33 billion won11 and 17.18 billion 
won, respectively. On average, the Chaebol group has higher presence of 
foreign ownership than the non-Chaebol firms. No significant differences in 
sales growth were found and the significant difference in firm age and 
Tobin's q were only found in one of the tests.
Table 2.3. Characteristics of Chaebol group and non-Chaebol firms
Sum m ary Statistics Tests for D ifferences Between
Chaebol G roups firm s Non-Chaebol firm s the G roups
M ean M edian M ean M edian t-stat of Diff. W ilcoxon
V ariables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total labour cost (billion 115.33 39.80 17.18 6.33 18.205 *** 21.993***
Firm size 6.93 7.00 5.02 4.92 35.230*** 27.401***
Tobin's q 0.30 0.17 0.31 0.21 0.292 -4.045**
Sales growth 7.83% 5.69% 13.92% 5.58% 1.462 0.521
Foreign ownership 11.92% 4.05% 5.03% 0.29% 12.345*** 14.863***
Firm age 34.40 33 33.10 32 2.289* 1.838
Notes: The first two columns report the mean and median of the characteristics for the Chaebol group firms. 
Columns 5 and 6 report the t-statistics for the average difference, and the Wilcoxon signed rank statistics for the 
median difference.
* Significant at the 5% level
** Significant at the 1% level
*** Significant at the 0.1% level
11115.33 billion won is approximately 57 million British pounds using the average 
exchange rate during the sample period.
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5.2. Model Selection and Baseline Results
Table 2.4 reports the baseline regression results for the labour cost 
equation using three different econometric methodologies: pooling 
regression, random effect model, and fixed effect model. Column 1 is 
estimated using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) which assumes that 
the unobservable individual effect is zero. However, this assumption is too 
strong given the likelihood of large heterogeneity across industries and 
firms. To control for individual firm heterogeneity and omitted variable 
bias, the next two columns report the estimates using the random effect and 
fixed effect model (Wooldridge, 2002).
To identify which empirical methodology -  pooled OLS, random effect, 
or fixed effect regression -  is most reliable, we perform two statistical tests. 
The first test is the Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test developed by Breusch 
and Pagan (1980). The null hypothesis is that the individual effect is zero. 
The chi-square statistic (36.28) reported in Table 2.4 rejects the null 
hypothesis at the 0.1% significance level. This indicates that the cohort 
effect is not zero and that pooled regression is not appropriate for this 
model. The regression coefficient on foreign ownership from the pooled 
regression is equal to 0.005 and is significant at the 5% level. The 
regression coefficients on foreign ownership from the random and fixed 
effect model are both 0.003, significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively. 
The coefficients estimated from the pooled OLS regression are much larger 
than those estimated from the random or the fixed effect models suggesting 
that ignoring individual firm effects leads to an over-estimation of the 
impact of foreign ownership on labour cost. The second test is the 
Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) to compare the random effect 
and the fixed effect models. The null hypothesis that the random effect
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model is more efficient (has smaller asymptotic variance) than the fixed 
effect model is rejected at the 0.1% level. Thus, the fixed effect model is 
most appropriate in estimating our labour cost model.
Model (3) shows that the level of total labour cost is significantly 
positively related to foreign ownership.12 A 5% increase in foreign 
ownership is associated with 1.51% (expA0.003*5) increase in labour cost in 
the following year.
12 Here we treat the effect of foreign ownership to be the same for all size firms. Table 
2.8 in the Appendix 1 reports the regression results where we include an interaction 
term, (Firm Size * Foreign Ownership). The interaction term is significant and positive.
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Table 2.4. Regression Models (OLS, Random Effect and Fixed Effect)
Independent Variables
D ependent Variable: log(total labour cost)
Pooled OLS Panel random  effect Panel fixed effect
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -2.274*** -1.805*** -1.217***
(0.085) (0.173) (0.341)
Firm Size a-v 0.812*** 0.644*** 0.430***
(0.017) (0.034) (0.070)
Tobin's q a-v 0.016 0.077* 0.063*
(0.051) (0.031) (0.028)
Sales growth a-v 0.000 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Foreign ownership (t-v 0.005* 0.003** 0.003*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm age a-v 0.002 0.013*** 0.031***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.008)
Chaebol group firms a-v 0.084 0.188** 0.111 +
(0.065) (0.054) (0.059)
O bservations 2332 2332 2332
(Groups) 496 496
A djusted R2 0.625 0.612 0.503
F-statistics 683.15*** 22.57***
W ald chi2 599.56***
LM test C h i2 (l) = 36.28***
H ausm an test Chi2 (6) = 58.21***
Notes: The Lagrangian Multiplier test (IM  test) is used to test the random effect model versus the pooled OLS 
regression. The Hausman specification test is used to test the fixed-effect model versus the random effect model. 
For the pooled OLS regression, the Huber/White/Sandwich estimators of standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
For random and fixed effect model regressions, the heteroscedastidty consistent robust standard errors are shown 
in parentheses.
+ Significant at the 10% level
* Significant at the 5% level
** Significant at the 1% level
*** Significant at the 0.1% level
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5.3. Financial Performance and the Role of Foreign
Ownership
In the previous section, we have shown that foreign ownership has a 
significant positive effect on labour cost, suggesting that ownership 
structure plays an important role in firms' human resource management. 
However, this positive effect of foreign ownership is contradictory 
evidence to the previous empirical findings on the role of foreign 
ownership. Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005) argue that firms with more 
foreign investors are likely to have a "clash of capitalism" with Japanese 
managers as an ideology of U.S. investor capitalism pushes for maximizing 
shareholder value. Their theory suggests a negative relationship between 
foreign ownership and labour cost. Yoshikawa et al. (2005) show that 
foreign ownership is only associated with wage intensity when 
performance is low suggesting that the agency conflicts between Japanese 
managers and foreign shareholders are only present when firm 
performance is low.
To test for differences in the role of foreign ownership for high versus 
low firm performance, we modify equation (1) to the following:
log(total labour Cost) it = a  + pi (low financial performance) /, t-i
+ p2 (foreign ownership) t-i 
+ p3 (low financial performance) i t-i 
x (foreign ownership) i, t-i 
+ E pk (control variables) /, t-i + a t
(2)
where low financial performance is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if 
return on equity (ROE) is negative, and 0 otherwise. For robustness, we
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also use return on asset (ROA) as an alternate measure for financial 
performance. Both ROE and ROA are the most widely used fundamental 
ratios which investors use to evaluate their investments. Return on equity 
(ROE) measure the rate of return on the ownership interest of the common 
stock owners while return on asset (ROA) gives an indication of the 
management's effectiveness on generating return on assets.
The regression results are reported in Table 2.5. Model (1) reports the 
baseline fixed effect model (Equation 1) result as shown in Model (3) from 
Table 2.4. Models (2) and (3) in Table 2.4 report the modified (Equation 2) 
results which includes the moderating effects of low financial performance 
dummy variable on foreign ownership. The estimations in model (2) use 
negative ROE to indicate low financial performance and the estimations in 
model (3) use negative ROA to indicate low financial performance. The 
effects of both measures are negative and significant to total labour cost.
We find evidence supporting the theory that foreign ownership has a 
disciplining role in preventing overspending in labour. The estimated 
values of p3 are significant and negative for both measures of low financial 
performance. For firms with negative ROE, the coefficient for foreign 
ownership is /fe + and, for other firms (with ROE > 0), it is /fc. The results 
imply that foreign ownership has a positive impact on labour cost for 
profitable firms. However, for firms with low financial performance, the 
foreign ownership's impact on labour cost is negative (j$2 + p3 equals -0.01).
The results reported so far are robust in assumption that industry 
effects were subsumed under individual firm effects. However, there may 
be significant heterogeneity in firm characteristic across different industries. 
To check the robustness of our previous results, we control the industry 
effects by using the industry mean to adjust the variables in the model.
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Each variable is adjusted by deducting the mean of the industry to which 
the firm belongs. Models (4) - (6) present the results using the industry- 
adjusted variables13.
Again we find a significant and positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and labour costs, which implies that firms with more foreign 
ownership than the industry mean spend more on labour than those with 
less foreign ownership than the industry mean. The analyses yield 
consistent results for all estimated coefficients including control variables. 
We find a significant and positive relationship between labour cost and 
firm size, Tobin's q, and firm age. The relationship between labour cost 
and the Chaebol group firms is only significant at 10% level.
The results confirm the finding that foreign ownership has a positive 
impact on human capital investment and that this positive impact is only 
present for firms with strong financial performance.
13 Another way of controlling for industry effect is to use industry dummy variables in 
random effects model. However, since Hausman specification test indicated that fixed 
effect model is more efficient, it is more appropriate to use the industry adjustment 
approach.
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Table 2.5. Low Financial Performance, Foreign Ownership, and Labour Cost
Independent Variables
D ependent V ariable: log(total labour cost)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -1.217*** -1.242*** -1.258*** 0.003 0.019* 0.021*
(0.341) (0.341) (0.345) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Firm Size (t-v 0.430*** 0.441*** 0.449*** 0.430*** 0.441*** 0.449***
(0.070) (0.071) (0.073) (0.070) (0.071) (0.073)
Tobin's q a-v 0.063* 0.064* 0.062* 0.063* 0.064* 0.062*
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Sales growth a-v 0.001*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.001*** 0.070*** 0.070***
(0.000) (0.013) (0.013) (0.000) (0.013) (0.013)
Foreign ownership a-v 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
low financial performance (ROE) a-v -0.066* -0.066*
(0.027)
low financial performance (ROE) a-v -0.004* -0.004*
x Foreign ownership a-v (0.002) (0.002)
low financial performance (ROA) a-v -0.066* -0.066*
(0.030) (0.030)
low financial performance (ROA) a-v -0.004* -0.004*
x Foreign ownership a-v (0.002) (0.002)
Firm age a-v 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.029***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Chaebol group firms a-v 0.111+ 0.119+ 0.118+ 0.111+ 0.119+ 0.118+
(0.059) (0.061) (0.060) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060)
Industry m ean adjusted NO NO NO YES YES YES
A djusted R2 0.503 0.515 0.522 0.539 0.553 0.563
F-statistics 22.57*** 18.15*** 18.13*** 22.57*** 18.15*** 18.13***
Notes: Low financial performance (ROE) is a dummy variable w hich is equal to 1 if return on equity (ROE) is 
negative, and 0 otherw ise. The heteroscedasticity consistent robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
+ Significant at the 10% level
* Significant at the 5% level
** Significant at the 1% level
*** Significant at the 0.1% level
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5.4. Changes in Foreign Ownership and Changes in 
Labour Cost
In the previous sections, we have shown there is a significant 
relationship between foreign ownership and labour cost while controlling 
for various firm characteristics. Although we have used lagged 
specifications to infer causality, one can construct an equally persuasive 
argument for reverse causality: foreign owners may be attracted to firms 
that engaged in labour restructuring, rather than causing labour reforms. 
One alternative approach to tackle this potential endogeneity argument is 
to use instrumental variables in two-stage or three-stage models. However, 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) expresses critical concerns about this approach as 
finding valid and consistent instrumental variables for firm ownership are 
difficult to find.
Thus, in an effort to make our argument more plausible, we present the 
descriptive statistics for the changes in variables in Table 2.6 and compare 
the firm characteristics between the groups of firms which had 5% or more 
increases in foreign ownership and the others (less than 5% increase) 
during our sample period of 1998-2003. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
mean and median values for the firms which had 5% or more increases in 
foreign ownership from 1998 to 2003. The next two columns report the 
same summary statistics for the firms which had less than 5% increases in 
foreign ownership. Columns (5) and (6) report the univariate test results 
comparing the two groups. The t-statistics for the mean differences and the 
Wilcoxon signed rank statistics for the median differences are given. The 
results show significant differences between the groups in both mean and 
median for the A (total labour cost) and A (Tobin's q). The average changes in
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total labour cost were greater for the firms which had 5% or more increase 
in foreign ownership.
Table 2.6. Characteristics of Firms with 5% or More Increases in Foreign 
Ownership
Sum m ary Statistics 
A foreign ownership A foreign ownership 
>5% <5%
Tests for Differences Between 
the G roups
V ariables
M ean
(1)
M edian
(2)
M ean
(3)
M edian
(4)
t-stat on Diff. 
(5)
W ilcoxon
(6)
A Total labour cost (billion W) 27.241 4.117 1.573 1.301 3.699*** 5.451***
A log( total labour cost) 0.276 0.382 0.150 0.291 1.380 2.253*
A Tobin’s Q 0.171 0.131 -0.020 -0.008 5.403*** 7.011***
A Sales 138.727 99.481 31.476 12.434 9.755*** 7.589***
Notes: The first two columns report the mean and median of the characteristics Jbr the group affirms which had 5% 
or more increases in foreign ownership from 1998 to 2003. Columns 5 and 6 report the t-statistics for the average 
difference, and the Wilcoxon signed rank statistics for the median difference.
* Significant at the 5% level
** Significant at the 1% level
*** Significant at the 0.1% level
We can also check whether a change in foreign ownership has a longer- 
run impact on change in labour cost over the entire sample. If foreign 
owners have a significant influence on labour cost as our results imply, 
then as foreign ownership increases over time, we can expect to see a 
corresponding change in labour costs.
By using the calculated changes (the changes in variables across our 
sample period, that is, 2003 values less 1998 values) reported in table 2.6, 
we regress the changes in total labour cost on changes in foreign ownership,
controlling for potential confounding variable changes (firm size, Tobin's q,
an sales growth) on changes in total labour cost. Table 2.7 reports the results 
of this regression. We find a strong positive relation between the long-run
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change in total labour cost and the long-run change in foreign ownership. 
The results of Table 2.7 further support the hypothesis that foreign 
investors have a significant impact on labour cost.
Table 2.7. OLS Regression on the Long-run Changes in Foreign Ownership and 
Total Labour Cost
D ependent Variable: A total labour cost
Independent Variables (1)
Intercept 1.914***
(0.530)
A Firm Size 9.480**
(2.856)
A Tobin’s Q -1.323
(1.322)
A Sales growth 0.080**
(0.002)
A Foreign Ownership 0.316**
(0.105)
A djusted R2 0.020
F-statistics 5.90***
Notes: The Changes in variables are measured as the difference between the firms' total labour cost over the years 
1998 to 2003. The HuberfWhite/Sandwich estimators of standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5% level
** Significant at the 1% level
*** Significant at the 0.1% level
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6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Labour markets and government policies are both affected by the 
process of liberalization and globalization (Downes, Gomez & Gunderson, 
2004). The financial crisis experienced in Korea and the consequent 
financial market liberalization and corporate restructuring during the late 
1990s and early 2000s offer a valuable opportunity to examine 
organizational change. In response to the call for corporate restructuring, 
the Korean government relaxed its traditional labour laws and allowed 
firms to abandon "permanent employment" practices and pursue labour 
flexibility. Labour flexibility was achieved by cutting employment and 
substituting permanent union workers with non-regular, non-union 
workers in order to reduce labour costs.
The objective of this study was to examine the relationship between 
economic and capital market pressures to disinvest in human capital. This 
paper extended earlier empirical studies on the relationship between 
ownership structure and human capital. It examined the relationship using 
a unique Korean panel dataset. Since many Korean firms were going 
through aggressive corporate restructuring during our sample period, this 
study allowed us to capture the role of foreign ownership in post-crisis 
times. Thus, this paper empirically examined the influence of previous 
period's foreign ownership and financial performance on labour costs in 
publicly listed Korean firms.
We found that foreign ownership is positively related to the level of 
labour costs, and that this positive effect is significantly weaker for firms 
with weak financial performance (measured as negative ROE or ROA) than 
those with strong financial performance. The relationship between foreign
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ownership and labour cost is robust to alternative econometric 
methodologies. These results support the hypothesis that foreign investors 
influence total labour cost. The results are also consistent with previous 
studies that suggest owner plays a monitoring role. For example, Mehran 
(1995) and Hartzell and Starks (2003) provide evidence of investor 
monitoring in executive compensation. Bushee (1998) and Kim et al. (2008) 
provide evidence of institutional investors monitoring R&D expenses.
The financial crisis in the late 1990s forced Korean firms to turn 
away from their earlier practice of "over investment" in human resources, 
characterized by high employment security and training commitment, and 
to seek a new human resource management strategy. Our results provide 
support for the view that foreign ownership has a disciplining role for 
firms with weak financial performance. Contrary to previous studies that 
raise concern about the myopic view of foreign investors on maximizing 
shareholder value by cutting cost at all levels, our results imply that foreign 
owners take a monitoring role and support the investments in human 
capital if firms can deliver strong financial performance.
Our findings suggest a monitoring or disciplining role of capital 
markets. An important area for future research is which forms of labour 
flexibility have greater impact on labour efficiency which then may lead to 
firm performance. As discussed before, there are numerous ways firms can 
enhance labour flexibility (e.g. changes to working hours without layoffs, 
reduction in working hours, hiring freezes, voluntary retirement, 
outsourcing, base pay reduction, wage freezes, bonus and benefits 
reduction, dispatch to an affiliated company, redeployment to other 
departments after training, etc). A detailed analysis of the effects of these 
labour flexibility "tools" on firm performance would help us understand
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better how external monitoring can lead to maximizing effective use of 
internal resources for all stakeholders.
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APPENDIX 1
Table 2.8. Panel Fixed Effect with an Interaction Term
Independent Variables
D ependent V ariable: log(total labour cost)
(1)
Intercept -1.104**
(0.340)
Firm Size <t-v 0.419***
(0.070)
Tobin’s q (t-v 0.058*
(0.027)
Sales growth (t-v 0.070***
(0.014)
Foreign ownership (t-v 0.002*
(0.001)
Firm age (t-v 0.029**
(0.009)
Chaebol group firms (t-v 0.123+
(0.068)
Firm Size * Foreign Ownership (t-v 0.001*
(0.000)
A djusted R2 0.524
F-statistics 19.31***
Notes:
+ Significant at the 10% level
* Significant at the 5% level
** Significant at the 1% level
*** Significant at the 0.1% level
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Essay Three:
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND DONATIONS
106
ABSTRACT
This paper empirically examines the relationship between firm ownership 
structure and corporate charitable donations. Using a panel data set of 
1,017 listed Korean firms, we find that larger firms with higher advertising 
intensity and lower export intensity 'give7 relatively more, suggesting that 
charitable donations are both strategic and discretionary corporate 
expenditures. In addition, the study explores the effects of ownership 
structure on corporate philanthropy. We find a positive relationship 
between charitable donations and foreign ownership. However, we do not 
find a significant effect of corporate philanthropy on financial performance, 
indicating that donations appear to be "revenue" neutral.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study investigates the role of corporate ownership structure in 
determining corporate charitable donations. Previous papers have sought 
to investigate charitable donations as an indicator of corporate 
philanthropy (Johnson 1966; Navarro, 1998). Since donations are a 
measurable and visible component of business social performance (Amato 
and Amato, 2007), many empirical studies have used this a priori indicator 
for the level of corporate philanthropy. These studies have linked 
corporate philanthropy to advertising (Brammer and Millington, 2004), 
board composition (Wang and Coffey, 1992), various stakeholders 
(Clarkson, 1995), visibility (Campbell and Slack, 2006), and reputation 
(Brammer and Millington, 2005). However, many previous empirical 
papers in this area suffer from sampling limitations due to the lack of 
accounting disclosure in corporate donations. Thus the findings from 
rigorous empirical analysis based on reliable longitudinal data are limited 
(Adams and Hardwick, 1998, for example, used only 1994 data drawn from 
100 random U.K. listed companies).
Our findings add to the literature in four important ways. First, by 
using accounting data of corporate donations, we overcome some of the 
potential sampling bias problems experienced in previous studies. Many 
existing empirical studies in the field have noted this problem as the major 
limitation in the field (Seifert et al., 2003; Amato and Amato, 2006). Second, 
we add to the literature on the strategic determinants of corporate 
donations by introducing a role for firms' export intensities in corporate 
philanthropy. Third, we explore the relationship between equity 
ownership and corporate philanthropy by using a unique Korean corporate
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ownership panel dataset. Lastly, the paper empirically examines the much 
debated link between corporate philanthropy and corporate financial 
performance.
We find, in keeping with previous studies, that larger firms with higher 
advertising expenditures relatively 'give' more. We also show that firms 
with lower export intensity give relatively more to charity. We find strong 
evidence of a positive relationship between foreign ownership and 
charitable donations. However, we do not find a significant link between 
corporate philanthropy and financial performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews 
the relevant literature on corporate philanthropy. Section 3 describes the 
data and outlines the empirical models used in the analysis, and Section 4 
discusses the empirical results. In Section 5, the limitations of this study 
are discussed and suggestions for future research are given. Finally, 
Section 6 details the implications of these results.
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2. CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY, OWNERHSIP, AND  
PERFORMANCE
In this section, we explore the three determinants of corporate 
philanthropy. Then we provide a review of both conceptual and empirical 
findings that link corporate philanthropy to corporate ownership structure 
and financial performance.
2.1. Determinants of Corporate Donations 
Firm Size and Industry
Many of the empirical studies on corporate philanthropy emphasize the 
role of firm size on corporate donations (McElroy and Siegfried, 1985; 
Adams & Hardwick, 1998). Useem (1988) argues that firm size is the most 
important determinant of corporate giving and that large firms contribute 
regardless of profit levels. Useem also argues that industry differences 
serve as a structural determinant of corporate donations as industries with 
high levels of public contact such as retailing or banking typically give 
more than firms in low contact industries such as mining. The need for 
controlling for industry factors has been supported by many empirical 
studies including Seifert et al. (2003) and Amato and Amato (2007).
Resource Availability
Another widely accepted view in the literature on corporate 
philanthropy stems from the slack resource view, addressed in the works 
of McGuire et al. (1988) and Ullmann (1985). The argument is that 
profitable firms can afford to give more as shown in Waddock and Graves
110
(1997) and that a significant and positive relationship exists between social 
performance and prior profitability. More recent research has extended 
this argument by testing for the effect of different proxies for firm resources, 
i.e. cash flow, profitability and the debt ratio of the firm (Seifert et al. 2003; 
Brammer and Millington, 2006).
Strategic Philanthropy
The term "strategic philanthropy" has been used to support the 
argument that corporate philanthropy is not pure charity and that 
corporate donation expenditures are subject to managerial discretion aimed 
at helping the company's bottom line. Much pioneering research in 
corporate philanthropy has argued that charitable donations are part of a 
strategic plan (e.g., Fry et al., 1982; Mescon and Tilson, 1987) and corporate 
donation is a tool to increase reputation or brand name. For example, 
donations may improve consumer perceptions of firms (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2000) and increase reputation among peers (Brammer and 
Millington, 2005). These consistent empirical findings further support the 
views of Amato and Amato (2007) and Seifert et al. (2004) that donation 
serves as advertising.
2.2. Corporate Donations and Ownership
Although corporate philanthropy has been documented as an effective 
way for a firm to fulfil its social responsibility (Berman et al., 1999), the 
benefits of "strategic philanthropy" may not satisfy the interests of 
stakeholders. While Clarkson (1995) documents the need for the CEO to 
balance the interests of multiple stakeholders such as employees, customers, 
suppliers, shareholders, and the local community in evaluating corporate
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social performance, the agency theory perspective puts more weight on 
conflicting interests between top management and shareholders as 
Ullmann (1985) argues firms incur unnecessary costs by giving away 
shareholders7 money. Some view corporate giving as 'social currency for 
the CEO7 and an attempt by executives to enhance their self-image and 
prestige (Harley, 1991) supporting the view that corporate involvement in 
philanthropy does not maximize shareholder wealth (Atkinson and 
Galaskiewicz, 1988).
However, more recent research has documented various stakeholder 
groups7 pressure to pursue corporate philanthropy. Wang and Coffey 
(1992), using a sample of 78 Fortune 500 firms from the year 1984, find 
positive relationships between charitable contributions and higher insider 
stock ownership, and more female and minority board members. The 
finding that firms with female directors engage more in charitable activities 
is replicated by Williams (2003) using a sample of 185 Fortune 500 firms for 
the 1991-1994 time period.
Brammer and Millington (2004) document that corporate donations 
determined by profits have weakened during the 1990s compared to earlier 
periods as firms have become more responsive to demands by stakeholders 
such as ethical fund managers in the U.K. Despite the widely recognized 
influence of shareholders, few studies have investigated the role of 
ownership structure. Graves and Waddock (1994) find that the number of 
institutional investors is positively related to corporate social performance, 
and Johnson and Greening (1999) find a positive relationship between 
pension fund investments and corporate social performance. Cox et al. 
(2004) extend the literature by documenting that long-term institutional 
investment is positively related to corporate social performance, using 600
112
of the largest U.K. firms. Although this research uses different indicators 
for 'social performance' (measures collated by independent research 
companies), the results suggest investors may differ in their preferences 
regarding corporate philanthropy.
2.3. Corporate Donations and Firm Performance
There have been various conceptual and empirical attempts to study 
the relationship between corporate philanthropy and financial performance 
(e.g., Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Rowley and Berman, 2000). However, there 
is no conclusive consensus. For example, Wokutch and Spencer (1987) and 
Orlitzky et al. (2003) find a positive relationship between corporate 
philanthropy and financial performance, whereas Berman et al. (1999) and 
Seifert et al. (2004) do not find a significant relationship. More recent 
empirical findings have suggested a non-linear relationship between 
corporate philanthropy and financial performance (Brammer and 
Millington, 2008; Wang et al., 2008). However, these studies also report 
contradictory findings.
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3. DATA, VARIABLE MEASUREMENT AND EMPIRICAL 
DESIGN
3.1. Data
Most of the studies in corporate philanthropy have been hindered by 
limited data availability. Previous studies on corporate donations have 
heavily relied on third-party references such as The Taft Corporate Giving 
Directory, the Foundation Center data, and the United States Inland 
Revenue Service (IRS) data. However, the studies that use the Taft 
Corporate Giving Directories (e.g. Seifert et. al., 2003; Wang et. al., 2008) are 
limited to the (about 1,000) largest corporate firms that give at least 
$200,000 per year. The alternative method, using the IRS data, suggested 
by Fry et al. (1982), is limited to firms with $250 million or more in total 
assets. For U.K. studies, firm's "Directors' Reports" have been used to 
study charitable contributions since the Companies Act of 1967 requires 
firms to disclose donations over £200. However, the data also contains 
contributions to political entities and it is difficult to distinguish between 
political and charitable purposes (Cowton, 1987).
Our data comes from the Korean Investors Services (KISVALUE-3) 
database, which reports firm profile, financial accounting, and ownership 
information. The corporate donations amount, the main variable of interest 
in our study, is sourced from the firms' annual financial statements. 
Having more reliable and audited corporate donations data is one of the 
main advantages we gain from the Korean accounting practice of reporting 
charitable donations as an expense in the income statement for publicly 
traded firms. Thus our sample includes all listed non-financial firms on the
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Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and Korea Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (KOSDAQ) between 1998 and 2003.
While most of the empirical literature on the corporate philanthropy is 
based on cross sectional data, our longitudinal data allows us to account for 
the changes in the variables over time to estimate the effects of the various 
independent variables on corporate donations. This advantage of using 
panel data over a pure cross-sectional data can add value beyond the 
current empirical findings (Baltagi, 2005).
Our panel data is imbalanced with a minimum number of observation 
of 3 years and a maximum of 6. The average number of years that a firm is 
present in the dataset is 5.2 years. The sample size reaches the maximum of 
1,017 firms in year 2001 and a minimum of 672 firms in 1998.
3.2. Corporate Donations: A first look
Our current understanding of global corporate philanthropy trends is 
limited. International comparisons are difficult to make given the variation 
in data collection methods. However, a general trend study in the US and 
the UK by Campbell et al. (2002) shows that British corporate contributions 
are increasing but the ratio of charitable donations to profits is still lower 
than for American firms. Brammer and Millington (2008) report £426,000 
as the average charitable donation by UK firms during 1990-1999. Meijer et 
al. (2006) report that in the Netherlands, 43 per cent of total estimated 
giving of 2.27 billion euro in 2003 was contributed by corporations.
Figure 3.1 charts the Korean corporate philanthropy trends for the 
period 1998-2003. The bars in Figure 3.1 show the yearly aggregate 
donations by all listed firms. Corporate philanthropy plays a significant 
role in Korean society. The average aggregate donation by corporations for
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the whole period was 820 billion won1 and according to Kim (2003), 82 per 
cent of total charitable donations in 2003 are estimated to have come from 
corporations. The fluctuating line in Figure 3.1 illustrates the mean value 
of corporate donation intensity calculated as the ratio of total donations to 
total sales. On average, publicly listed firms spent about 0.1 per cent of 
total sales on charitable donations.
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Figure 3.1. Time Trend of Corporate Donations
The figure shows corporate donations on a year-by-year basis 
over the period 1998-2003. The bars depict the total corporate 
donations of the Korean stock market, reflected on the left scale. 
The line in the figure shows the donation intensity measured as 
the ratio of total donations to total sales of the firm, reflected on 
the right scale.
1 W820 billion Korean Won is approximately equal to $683 million (USD) (using the 
exchange rate quoted at the end of year 2003).
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Table 3.1 provides the yearly ranking of the top ten donors. Panel A 
ranks by the total amount and Panel B ranks by donation intensity which is 
scaled by sales. Consistent with the previous literature, larger firms 
generally support higher levels of giving than smaller firms (Stanwick and 
Stanwick, 1998). Large, global, and Chaebol (conglomerate) corporations 
dominate the rankings in Panel A. In fact, more than 50 per cent of total 
corporate donations come from these top ten donors. However, the 
rankings presented in Panel B tell a different story. For example, SK 
Telecom's 35.1 billion won donation ranked fourth in terms of total amount 
but in the relative ranking based on the donation to sales ratio, SK Telecom 
ranked only ninth by donating less than 1 percent of firm's sales in 1998. 
After controlling for the effects of firm size, many small and medium 
enterprises make up the top donors list. For example, Handsome 
Corporation, engaged in the manufacturing and sales of men and women's 
apparel, donated over 3 per cent of sales during the period 1999-2003.
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Table3^Toj^Ten
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Panel A. List of top 10 Companies in terms of DONATIONS
Rank Company DONATIONS
M
Company DONATIONS
M
Company DONATIONS
M
Company DONATIONS
mm)
Company DONATIONS
(V ttm )
Company DONATIONS
mm)
1 POSCO 171.35 Samsung Electronics 139.06 POSCO 438.51 SK Telecom 111.15 Korea Electric Power 76.83 Korea Electric Power 125.09
2 Korea Electric Power 82.22 POSCO 110.69 Samsung Electronics 170.53 Korea Electric Power 103.00 SK Telecom 67.43 KT Corporation 105.28
3 Samsung Electronics 56.03 SK Corporation 75.81 Korea Electric Power 156.17 POSCO 73.43 KT Corporation 56.59 Samsung Electronics 104.56
4 SK Telecom 35.10 KT Corporation 73.74 SK Telecom 44.16 KT Corporation 54.72 POSCO 43.52 POSCO 97.37
5 KT Corporation 19.97 Korea Electric Power 71.47 KT Corporation 31.75 Samsung Electronics 29.85 Hyundai Heavy Ind. 41.21 Cheil Ind. 49.99
6 Samsung SDI 19.16 SK Telecom 23.66 Hyundai Heavy Ind. 30.83 SK Corporation 22.91 Samsung Electronics 35.31 KT&G Corporation 42.71
7 Daesang 8.64 Hyundai Heavy Ind. 16.15 SK Corporation 29.73 KT&G Corporation 22.32 SK Corporation 23.22 Samsung SDI 32.06
8 Korean Air 7.03 Samsung SDI 9.93 Korea Gas Corp 21.16 Samsung SDI 19.04 Korea Gas Corp 22.30 Korea Gas Corp 31.10
9 Hyundai Motors 6.48 Korean Air 9.58 Korean Air 18.28 Kumho Industrials 17.55 Daewoo Engineering 21.97 SK Telecom 25.78
10 Samsung Electro-Mech. 5.91 Hanjin Heavy Ind. 9.52 Kolon Ind. 10.82 Hyundai Heavy Ind. 16.89 KT&G Corporation 20.31 Nongshim 18.88
Panel B. List of top 10 Companies in terms of DONATIONS/ SALES
Rank Company d o n a t io n s / sales  Company DONATIONS /SALSs Company DONATIONS/SALH1s Company do n a tio n s / sales Company DONATIONS /SALE!s Company DONATIONS /SALES
TO TO TO TO TO TO
1 Korean Airport Service 2.53 Handsome Corp 3.96 Handsome Corp 6.23 Handsome Corp 4.66 Handsome Corp 3.87 Handsome Corp 3.59
2 DSP Entertainment 2.07 Korean Airport Service 1.84 Genexel-Sein 4.12 Samchundang Pharm. 3.32 HanalL Pharm 2.20 Youlchon Chemical 3.43
3 Dongil Technology 1.96 Inits Corp 1.64 POSCO 3.75 Nanoen Tek 2.41 Handysoft 2.17 Kwangjin Ind. 2.65
4 Handsome Corp 1.66 Korea Cast Iron Pipe 1.49 Choheung Corp 2.91 Handysoft 1.93 Woojin Chemical 2.08 Tong Yang Major Corp 2.21
5 Cheil Communications 1.65 Synopex 1.38 Green Cross Foldings 2.36 Kyundong Pharm 1.92 Samchundang Pharm. 2.04 Cheil Ind. 2.20
6 POSCO 1.54 Mirae Corp. 1.29 Samchundang Pharm. 2.00 Turbo tek 1.86 Seobu Truck Terminal 1.96 KT&G Corp 1.96
7 Daeduk GDS 123 Asia Cement 1.26 Kyungdong Pharm. 1.96 SK Telecom 1.78 YeshinPJ 1.79 Asia Cement 1.88
8 Asia Cement 1.02 Bohae Brewery 1.21 Wonpung Mulsan 1.81 Korea Information Serv. 1.71 Asia Cement 1.72 K & Company 1.80
9 SK Telecom 0.99 Samyang Genex 1.13 Korean Airport Service 1.82 Asia Cement 1.67 Sekonix 1.69 Korea Cast Iron Pipe 1.59
10 Samyang Genex 0.98 Wonpung Mulsan 1.12 Virtualtek Corp 1.55 FIT Inc. 1.44 Kyungdong Pharm. 1.35 Korean Airport Service 1.52
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3.3. Variable Measurement
Dependent Variable
Our main dependent variable (Donations) is the ratio of donation 
expenditures to sales. This measure has been widely used in previous 
studies to control for the effects of firm size (e.g. Williams, 2003; Wang et. 
al., 2008).
Independent Variable
The key independent variable is the ownership structure of the firm. 
Foreign ownership is the percentage of equity ownership held by foreign 
investors. During our sampling period, many firms had changes in their 
ownership structure as the financial market liberalization took place 
following the 1997 Asian financial crisis (See the discussion in Chang et. al, 
1998). Therefore we can observe the effects of changes in equity ownership 
structure on corporate philanthropic activity.
Control Variables
Previous studies have shown that several variables can influence the 
level of corporate charitable donations. These include firm size (Useem, 
1988), leverage (Brammer and Millington, 2006), profitability (Seifert et al., 
2003) and advertising (Amato and Amato, 2007). Firm size is measured as 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage or debt ratio is defined as the 
ratio of total debt to total assets. Firm performance is measured as return on 
assets (ROA). Advertising is measured as the ratio of total advertising 
expenditure to total sales.
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In this study we suggest a new variable, export intensity which is 
defined as the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. Waddock and Graves 
(1997) and Saiia et al. (2003) allude to the fact that corporate philanthropy 
expenditures are geared towards close stakeholders such as local (domestic 
or regional) customers. Therefore we predict that firms engaged more in 
domestic markets (lower export intensity) are also more likely have higher 
Donations.
Institutional and cultural settings can also shape corporate 
philanthropy. Chang (2003) shows that Chaebol groups have great societal 
impacts given their embedded Korean industrial settings. As Brammer and 
Millington (2005) find a positive relationship between the level of a firm's 
philanthropic expenditures and its reputation, Korean public sentiment 
may expect higher involvement of Chaebol groups in charitable engagement. 
Chaebol groups is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm belongs 
to one of the top 30 business groups specified by the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission.
Lastly, we control for industry effects on charitable donations by using 
the two-digit KSIC codes.
3.4. Model Specification
As we have cross-sectional time-series data, the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) method is not appropriate because it does not correct for within-firm 
autocorrelation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. To control for these 
issues, we employ the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) random-effects 
estimator for panel data as a Hausman test reveals that the estimated panel
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error is not correlated with independent variables, an assumption 
necessary for use of the random-effects model.2
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1. Determinants of Corporate Philanthropy
Table 3.2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations matrix for the 
main variables used in this study. Donation has a positive correlation with 
firm size and advertising, and a negative correlation with leverage and export 
intensity. The correlation between the level of donation and firm 
performance is small and not significant. A significant and positive 
correlation also exists between donation and foreign ownership. As a 
cautionary measure, we examined the variance inflation factors (VIFs) to 
detect multicollinearity. All of the VIF scores are below 5 and the mean VIF 
score was below 2 for all variables in the regression model. A commonly 
used rule of thumb for avoiding multicollinearity problem is to have VIF 
value of 10 or lower (Baum, 2006). Therefore the analysis is not affected by 
problems with multicollinearity.
2 Although Hausman test indicate that the random effect model is more efficient 
than the fixed effect model, we report the regressions results for the fixed effect 
model to demonstrate the robustness of our estimates in Appendix 1.
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Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Donation 0.11 0.30
2. Firm size 4.68 1.48 0.045*
3. Debt ratio 0.52 0.36 -0.038* 0.046*
4. Firm performance 0.00 0.49 -0.002 0.023 -0.170*
5. Advertising 0.01 0.03 0.062* -0.010 -0.086* -0.025
6. Export Intensity 0.26 0.30 -0.062* 0.122* -0.002 0.009* -0.209*
7. Foreign ownership 5.14 11.77 0.033* 0.321* -0.045* 0.033 * 0.056 * 0.080*
Notes: Significant at the p<0.05 level; N=5,156.
The main results are shown in Table 3.3. Model 1 is a basic model of 
the influences on corporate donations based on the previous literature. 
Firm size and advertising have a positive and significant effect on the level of 
corporate donations. However, profitability is not significant and leverage is 
only marginally significant (at p<0.10).
Model 2 extends the analysis by including export intensity. As 
hypothesized, export intensity has a negative effect on the level of corporate 
philanthropy (at p<0.001) meaning firms with more domestic sales engage 
more in corporate philanthropy activities, all other things being equal.
Model 3 controls for the institutional and cultural differences between 
Chaebol group firms and non -Chaebol group firms. Chaebol groups' 
corporate donation levels are not significantly different from the non- 
Chaebol groups. It may be that Chaebol groups' total contribution is higher 
than the other firms in absolute terms.3 However, when controlling for 
other determinants of corporate donations, the level of corporate
3 Unreported univariate sample t-test indicates Chaebol firms have a statistically higher 
mean donations expenditures than non-Chaebol firms (t=8.47, p=0.000).
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philanthropy by these corporate leaders was not higher than for the other 
firms.
Finally, Model 4 reports the effects of ownership on corporate 
philanthropy. The basic pattern of statistical significance for the other 
variables found in Models 1-3 remains controlling for firm size, leverage, 
profitability, advertising, export intensity, and Chaebol groups. Although 
the coefficient for the foreign ownership variable is small, the results 
indicate a significant and positive relationship between foreign ownership 
and corporate donations.
The overall statistical significance of the estimation models is tested 
using a Wald Chi-square test. The test shows that all models are 
statistically significant (p<0.001).
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Table 3.3. Determinants of Corporate Philanthropy
Variables
Dependent Variable: Donation (Donation/Sales*100)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 0.096 0.118 + 0.092 0.105 +
(0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061)
Firm size 0.014 * 0.019 ** 0.024*** 0.021**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Debt ratio -0.059 + -0.059+ -0.059 + -0.056
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
Firm performance -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Advertising 1.13 7*** 0.941 *** 0.913*** 0.879***
(0.287) (0.278) (0.281) (0.284)
Export Intensity -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.107***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Chaebol groups -0.043 -0.046
(0.028) (0.028)
Foreign ownership 0.001*
(0.000)
R2 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24
Wald x2 560.37*** 647.72*** 652.88*** 653.00***
Notes: Industry dummy variables are included but not reported in the table (joint significance test for industry 
dummies is significant at pO.OOl level); robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Significant at the+p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 level.
124
4.2. Does Corporate Philanthropy Add Market Value?
In the previous section, we tested for the determinants of corporate 
philanthropy. We found that larger firms with higher advertising and 
domestic sales and foreign ownership have significantly larger corporate 
giving levels. Some scholars have argued that "doing well on this" can 
lead to higher financial performance. However, as we briefly discussed in 
section 2.3, empirical evidence on the corporate philanthropy-financial 
performance relationship is inconclusive. So in this section, we attempt to 
test whether corporate philanthropy enhances financial performance.
The model specifications are similar to the one in the previous section, 
except that the dependent variable is financial performance. Corporate 
financial performance is measured as Tobin's q, a common accounting- 
based ratio of the market value of a company's stock to the value of a 
company's equity book value. Tobin's q was approximated as the sum of 
market value of equity and book value of debt divided by the sum of book 
value of total assets at the year end. The sample mean for Tobin's q is 1.08 
with standard deviation 1.84.
The key independent variable is donation, the level of corporate 
philanthropy, as defined earlier. The correlation with Tobin's q is reported 
in Table 3.4.
Table 3.5 presents the results: Model 1 estimates the effects of a few 
basic control variables we have used in the earlier models: firm size, leverage, 
profitability, advertising, Chaebol groups. Most of the variables had the 
expected signs and significant coefficients. Smaller firms tended to have 
higher levels of Tobin's q. Leverage, profitability and Chaebol group showed 
positive and significant effects on Tobin's q and advertising had a marginally 
significant effect (p<0.10) on financial performance.
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In Model 2, the level of corporate giving was added to assess its 
possible effect on financial performance. It was found to have no 
significant effect on Tobin's q. This non-significant relationship between 
corporate philanthropy and financial performance is consistent with 
previous studies (Berman et al., 1999; Seifert et al., 2004).
In Model 3, we test for the non-linear relationship Wang et al. (2008) 
proposed by adding a quadratic term for giving. By adding both donation 
and its squared term, we did not find a significant relationship. In 
conclusion, the results of this analysis suggest that, contrary to some 
contemporary thinking, charitable donations do not affect financial 
performance.
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Table 3.4. Correlations with Tobin's q
Variables Tobin's q
Donation -0.003
Firm size -0.107*
Leverage 0.265*
Profitability -0.025
Advertising 0.138*
Export intensity -0.033*
Notes:Significant at the p<0.05 level; N=5,156.
Table 3.5. Financial Performance Models
Dependent Variable: Tobin's q
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 0.917*** 0.917*** 0.916***
(0.102) (0.103) (0.103)
Firm size -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.113***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.104)
Leverage 0.655*** 0.655*** 0.656***
(0.120) (0.120) (0.120)
Profitability 0.114** 0.114** 0.114**
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Advertising 9.320 + 9.316+ 9.301+
(5.514) (5.522) (5.544)
Export intensity 0.058 0.058 0.060
(0.118) (0.117) (0.116)
Chaebol groups 0.106* 0.106* 0.106*
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Donation 0.001 0.015
(0.013) (0.055)
(Donation)2 -0.001
(0.004)
R2 0.26 0.26 0.26
Wald x2 667.47*** 667.82*** 664.530***
Notes: Industry dummy variables are included but not reported in the table (joint significance test for industry 
dummies is significant at p<0.001 level); robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Significant at the*p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 level.
12 7
5. LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH
This study has some limitations that future research could address. 
First, our analysis has focused exclusively on a single aspect of corporate 
philanthropy: charitable donations. Firms can engage in many other forms 
of corporate philanthropy, e.g., community volunteering. Charitable 
donations may not be the optimal method for the firm to engage in 
corporate social responsibility. Future studies could address this issue. 
Second, our study uses an audited accounting measure of corporate 
donations. Although we believe this is a more reliable and accessible data 
source and prevents some of the sampling and data collection problems 
raised in previous research, the pitfall of using this data is that we do not 
know where and who received the donations. A future study which 
surveys corporate philanthropic activity in detail can test whether the 
proximity relationship exists as our findings on export intensity variable 
suggest.
Finally, the corporate philanthropy literature generally lacks global 
comparisons. As we believe this is the first comprehensive non-western 
corporate donation study, future research can extend this study by 
providing an international comparison which incorporates institutional 
factors such as regulatory incentives (e.g., tax benefits on donations) and 
the level of giving culture.
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6. CONCLUSION
We have analyzed the relationships between firm size, leverage, 
profitability, advertising, export intensity, business groups, industry, and 
ownership structure on corporate philanthropic expenditures for a sample 
of 1,017 Korean firms. The aim of this study was to re-examine the theories 
of corporate philanthropy by conducting a robust empirical analysis. By 
using the most comprehensive charitable donations data set, we can 
confirm previous findings that larger firms with higher advertising 
expenditures engage in higher levels of charity.
We also contribute to empirical research on strategic corporate 
philanthropy by introducing the effect of export intensity. Our findings 
suggest that corporate philanthropy has a negative relationship with export 
intensity. The significant relationship between domestic sales and 
corporate philanthropy supports the argument that corporate philanthropy 
is a discretionary and strategic corporate expenditure aimed at generating 
local goodwill. This, in turn, creates a positive social image, induces 
stakeholder support and can also provide insurance-like protection for the 
firm's relational assets (Fombrun et al., 2000; Goodfrey, 2005).
However, we only found a weak relationship between leverage (debt 
ratio) and firm giving. This finding implies that companies may engage in 
corporate philanthropy simply because their peers do (Galaskiewicz and 
Burt, 1991) or there may exist some cultural or societal level of corporate 
giving.
Another main contribution of this research relates to the importance of 
ownership effects on corporate philanthropy. We have found a positive
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and significant relationship between corporate giving and foreign 
ownership.
The positive effects of foreign ownership on corporate philanthropy can 
be explained by several factors. It may be that the long-term value, either 
financial benefit or strategic goodwill, from corporate philanthropy is 
valued more by long term investors such as foreign institutional investors. 
This finding sheds some light on the role of foreign investors. Conflicting 
evidence exists on corporate social responsibility (CSR) by foreigners. 
While Logsdon and Wood (2005) argue that global multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) often fail to respond effectively to CSR issues of 
importance in their host countries, Chappie and Moon (2005) find that 
globalization enhanced the adoption of CSR in Asia. The finding that 
foreign ownership has a positive effect on corporate philanthropy while 
Chaebol groups have no significant effect is a controversial finding for an 
emerging market like Korea.
Lastly, we have tested for the much debated relationship between 
corporate philanthropy and corporate financial performance. The 
hypothesis that corporate philanthropy can enhance market value was not 
supported.
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APPENDIX 1
Table 3.6. Determinants of Corporate Philanthropy (fixed effect models)
_________ Dependent Variable: Donation (Donation/Sales*100)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 0.112** 0.119** 0.101** 0.111
(0.036) (0.035) (0.030) (0.028)
Firm size 0.017* 0.021* 0.026** 0.022
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Debt ratio -0.165*"* -0.163*** -0.163*** -0.155
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Firm performance -0.053 -0.049 -0.049 -0.051
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.028)
Advertising 1.745* 1.471* 1.433* 1.382
(0.695) (0.656) (0.646) (0.675)
Export Intensity -0.094** -0.094** -0.098
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Chaebol groups -0.037 -0.041
(0.031) (0.031)
Foreign ownership 0.002
(0.001)
R2 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.11
F-statistics 14.23*** 12.91*** 12.25*** 11.00
Notes: Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
Significant at the + pO.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 level.
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